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YICKWOAT 125: FOUR SIMPLE LESSONS FOR THE
CONTEMPORARY SUPREME COURT
Marie A. Failinger*
The 125th anniversary of Yick Wo v. Hopkins is an important opportunity to
recognize the pervasive role of law in oppressive treatment of Chinese immigrants in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is also a good opportunity for the Supreme
Court to reflect onfour important lessons gleaned from Yick Wo. First, the Court
should never lend justification to the evil of class discrimination, even if it has to
decline to rule in a case. Second, where there is persistent discrimination against a
minority group, the Court must be similarly persistent in fighting it. Third, the
Court needs to take legislative motivation more seriously in cases of persistent class
discrimination. Finally, the Court cannot give sanction to any dominant group's
view that the country's economic and social wealth belongs to them.
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INTRODUCTION
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, a staple of every Constitutional Law course, was
125 years old this past year.' In a perhaps fitting commemorative, in 2010
the City of San Francisco, where Yick Wo was arrested and
* Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law. I would like to thank my
research assistant, George Blesi, for his careful read and able assistance.
1. YickWo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) was decided on May 10, 1886.
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imprisoned, appointed its first Chinese American mayor, Ed Lee. 2 This
event was greeted by the Asian Law Caucus with the statement, "This is
an historic moment for our great City. It signals a new era in San Francis-
co government and also for the city's residents, over thirty percent of
whom are Asian American."3 In a classic story of backroom politics, Lee
was chosen by the San Francisco board of supervisors to complete the
mayoral term of new California Lieutenant Governor Gavin Newsom.'
The selection of a Chinese American mayor for San Francisco is par-
ticularly poignant in light of the California legislature's 2009 resolution
designating December 17th, the repeal date of the Chinese Exclusion
Acts, as a day to remember Yick Wo and recognize the contribution of
Chinese and other immigrants to the state of California.
Yick Wo has continued to spark academic debate, most recently in-
cited by Gabriel Chin, who questions whether Yick Wo is really a
property and treaty case rather than a race case;6 but the lessons of Yick
2. SeeJon Cote, Ed Lee Becomes the city'sfirst Chinese American mayor, SAN FRANcisco
CHRONICLE CITY INSIDER (Jan. 11, 2011, 4:13 PM), http://blog.sfgate.com/cityinsider/
2011/01 /11 /ed-lee-becomes-the-citys-first-chinese-american-mayor/.
3. See Leslie Berestein Rojas, San Francisco's first Chinese American mayor,
MULTIAMERICAN (Jan. 12, 2011, 4:57 PM), http://multiamerican.scpr.org/2011/01/
san-franciscos-first-chinese-american-mayor/.
4. See Rojas, supra note 3 (noting that as an Asian American mayor, Lee joins Jean
Quan, Oakland's new mayor). Political sources claim that Lee's appointment, which was
intended to be temporary until the subsequent election, was orchestrated by moderates
who were concerned that other candidates were too liberal, and by Rose Pak, a key Asian
political player in the San Francisco community. See Gerry Shih, Beyond the Scenes Power
Politics: The Making of a Mayor, NEW YORK TIMES,January 7, 2011, at 17A, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/us/07bcmayor.html?pagewanted=all#. Newsom came to
national attention when he authorized marriage licenses for gay and lesbian couples with-
out apparent authority from state law. See Rachel Gordon, THE BATTLE OVER
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE/ Uncharted territory / Bush's stance led Newsom to take action, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, February 15, 2004, at A-1, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/
2004-02-15/news/ 17411152_1_lesbian-couples-same-sex-marriage-gay-rights.
5. Assemb. Con. Res. 76, 2009 Assemb., Res. Ch. 108 (Cal. 2009), available at
http://www.decl7.org/acr_76_bill.pdf (legislative resolution establishing December 17 as
Day of Inclusion). See also December 17-From Exclusion to a Day of Inclusion, DEC17.ORG,
http:///www.decl7.org/about.html (last visited January 27, 2011) [hereinafter Dec. 17].
San Francisco has also honored Yick Wo with an elementary school named after him,
which has won two California Distinguished School awards. See Yick Wo Elementary School:
About our School, YICKWO.ORC, http://yickwo.org/ywes/about (last visited March 25,
2012).
6. See Gabriel Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts about Yick Wo, 2008
U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1363-64 (2008) (arguing that Yick Wo rested on the view that no one
may be deprived of property without due process, a position that necessarily depended
upon the Burlingame Treaty and amendments protecting Chinese nationals in the United
States). Chin's interpretation refuting Yick Wo as a seminal race discrimination case has
sparked a whole symposium in response. See, e.g., David Bernstein, Revisiting Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1393 (2008); Lenesse Herbert, On Precedent and Progeny: A
Response to Professor Gabriel]. Chin's "Doubts about Yick Wo," 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 1415
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Wo for constitutional adjudication reverberate beyond this debate. There
are at least four fairly simple lessons the justices can re-learn from the his-
tory behind Yick Wo. Constitutional scholars have been debating them for
decades in works too numerous to mention. However, the saga of Yick Wo
and the state and federal cases involving Chinese immigrants and citizens
in the late 19th century ("the Chinese cases") remind us of important
baseline lessons for the Court's treatment of seminal social justice issues
that come before the Court.These lessons are:
1. The Court should never lend its justification to the evil
of class discrimination, even if it must refuse to decide a
case as a consequence.
2. If the Court is going to strike at legal injustice, persis-
tence is an important virtue. An isolated victory for civil
rights, such as Yick Wo, will not make much of a differ-
ence for minority groups who are scapegoated or
pursued by angry or fearful majorities when it is not fol-
lowed up by similar rulings. In making such decisions,
historical context is critical for Supreme Court opinions
and should not be treated as irrelevant or tainted evi-
dence in these cases.
3. The Court needs to become serious in grappling with
the problem of legislative purpose in equal protection
cases. While the Court has frequently acknowledged that
legislative motivation is rarely pure, it has failed to set
clear and realistic standards for identifying and proving
invidious purpose.
4. At their core, many civil rights disputes are property dis-
putes: they embody the litigants' understanding about
who is entitled to the goods or advantages at stake. Yick
Wo and the Chinese cases should remind the Court that
if it simply gives in to majority assumptions about "who
owns" the social, moral, or material resources of our
country, its rulings will inevitably result in serious social
harm to minority groups.
I. RE-VISITING THE STORY
Yick Wo's own story in the case reports and histories is so sparse
that it is difficult to remember the man himself, much less his
(2008); Thomas Joo, Yick Wo Re-visited: Nonblack Nonwhites and Fourteenth A mendment His-
tory, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1427 (2008).
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co-appellant Wo Lee.7 But remember we should as long as we are going
to valorize civil disobedients like Rosa Parks as keepers of our social con-
science. Yick Wo came from China to the United States in 1861; by 1864
he had set himself up in the laundry business at 349 Third Street in San
Francisco, right behind the current Moscone Convention Center.' He
had successfully maintained a licensed laundry in San Francisco for at least
twenty-two years by 1885, when, after he was imprisoned for ignoring a
San Francisco supervisors' ordinance, his habeas corpus petition reached
the California Supreme Court.'
Professor David Bernstein and other historians suggest that the Chi-
nese launderers took up a necessary place in the Western social order: they
would do "women's work" for nonwealthy White men'o as a price of
earning a living and establishing a foothold in America. Men significantly
outnumbered women for the first few decades after the pueblo of Yerba
Buena was renamed San Francisco in 1847;" women were only about 16
percent of the population in 1853.12 Immigration restrictions on the entry
of Asian women, fueled in part by concerns that they would increase the
number of prostitutes in the city, exacerbated this gender discrepancy . As
7. See In re Wo Lee, 26 E 471, 476 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886) (holding that the federal
district court was not empowered through a writ of habeas corpus to overturn the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's ruling in Yick Wo that the laundry ordinance was constitutional);
see also CHARLES MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST Dis-
CRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 326 n.84 (1994) (suggesting that Yick Wo
is possibly the name of the launderer's business and not the defendant himself).
8. See Gerald P. Uelmen, A Lawyers' Walking Tour of San Francisco, 68 ABA JOURNAL
958, 964 (August 1982); see alsoYickWo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
9. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 356.
10. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parity and the Chinese Laundry, 41 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 211, 220 (1999). Bernstein notes that Chinese businesses primarily served non-
wealthy Whites, since wealthier Whites had servants to do their laundry. Id. at 224.
Ironically, Chinese launderers were criticized for taking jobs from White widows and sin-
gle women, or housewives, even though these women were in short supply in early
California. Id.
11. See Caroline Danielson, Men: Women in Early San Francisco, FouNDSF,
http://foundsf.org/index.php?title=Men_:_WomeninEarlySanFrancisco (last visited
March 25,2012).
12. Id. (noting that there were 138 women out of 500 inhabitants at the city's
founding, but by 1853, of the 50,000 residents of San Francisco, only 8,000 were women
and 300 were children); see also Martin Brown & Peter Phillips, Competition, Racism, and
Hiring Practices among California Manufacturers, 1860-1882, 40 INDUs.& LAB. REL. REv. 61,
62 (1986).
13. See JOHN JUNG, CHINESE LAUNDRIES: TICKETS TO SURVIVAL ON GOLD MOUNTAIN
25-26 (2007). The Page Act, passed in 1875, demonstrates this fear: aimed at the immigra-
tion of "Mongolian, Chinese or Japanese females for immoral purposes," it required
immigrants to prove they were of "good character," i.e., implied that they were presumed
to be prostitutes until they proved otherwise. Id. Jung notes that this was one of many
reasons that Chinese wives preferred to stay in China. Id. For a discussion of prostitution
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a result, it was difficult "to furnish [the bachelors of California] with clean
linen when [they] desire[d] because there [weren't] enough washerwomen
or wives around to do it."" Those Native and Spanish American women
who were in business began to charge such high prices that some workers
sent their clothing to Hong Kong to be laundered and returned months
later." However, "[t]he Chinese and the free [Nlegroes, of whom there
was now [in 1851] a goodly sprinkling .... performed washing and
women's business, and such menial offices as American White males
would scorn to do for any remuneration."1 6
As immigrants, Yick Wo and his countrymen found themselves in a
familiar place in American history: even though they were often per-
forming work not desired by Whites, they remained the social targets of
high economic and social anxiety in a tight California labor market. The
San Francisco labor market stood at the vortex of four streams of hun-
gry workers: disillusioned miners coming to the city at the end of the
Gold Rush," skilled Chinese immigrants finishing work on the Trans-
continental Railroad in 1869, White workers seeking refuge from an
economic depression in the East,'" and immigrants sailing into San
in nineteenth century California, see Danielson, supra note 11. Danielson notes that in
1870, only five manufacturers had women employees.
14. Danielson, supra note 11 (quoting FELIX PAUL WIERZBICK, CALIFORNIA AS IT IS
AND As IT MAY BE: OR, A GUIDE TO THE GOLD FIELDS 80-81 (1849)).
15. Bernstein, supra note 10, at 217.
16. Danielson, supra note 11, at 3 (quoting FRANK SOULE, JOHN H. GIHON, AND JAMES
NISBET, THE ANNUALS OF SAN FRANCISCO, CONTAINING A SUMMARY OF THE HISTORY OF
CALIFORNIA AND A COMPLETE HISTORY OF ITS GREAT CITY 369 (1855)).
17. See HENRY KITTRIDGE NORTON, THE STORY OF CALIFORNIA FROM THE EARLIEST
DAYS TO THE PRESENT 283 (2nd ed. 1913) (noting that Chinese laborers were largely em-
ployed as carpenters, cooks, and in draining and tilling); Bernstein, supra note 10, at 222
(noting that strikes by White miners led to bans on Chinese workers in many mining
operations).
18. See JUNG, supra note 13 (discussing the 10,000 Chinese workers unemployed
when the Central Pacific and Union Pacific railroads were united at Promontory Point,
Utah in 1869, and noting a similar phenomenon when the Canadian Pacific railroad was
completed in 1885); PAUL C. P SIU, THE CHINESE LAUNDRYMAN: A STUDY O SOCIAL ISOIA-
TION 48 (ed.John K.W Tchen, 1987) (noting the large demand for Chinese labor until the
end of the railroad building period); McCIAIN, supra note 7, at 298 n.163 (noting that the
Central Pacific Railroad was unable to secure an adequate and reliable labor force to build
the western part of the transcontinental railroad and decided to experiment with Chinese
laborers, including ex-miners looking for work); Ralph Kauer, The Workiqnfman's Party of
California, 13 PAC. HIST. REv. 278, 280 (1944).Jung notes that the completion of the rail-
roads exacerbated economic conditions for another reason: the railroads were able to bring
cheaper goods from the East Coast, damaging Western businesses.
19. See Kaner, supra note 18, at 279-81 (describing the industrial depression in the
mid 1870s, the national railroad strikes of 1877 which were crushed with military troops,
and the resulting agitation of West Coast laborers in defense of their rights); JEROME A.
HART, IN OUR SECOND CENTURY: FROM AN EDITOR'S NOTEBOOK 52-53 (1931), available at
The Virtual Museum of the City of San Francisco, http://www.sfinuseums.org/
hist2/kearneyism.htIl (last visited Mar. 27, 2012) (noting the severe economic effect of
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Francisco Bay.20 Historians tell us that White Americans were happy to
employ the Chinese for distasteful or low-paying economic development
work such as swamp clearing,21 mercury mining, 2 and railroad building.23
White citizens were even willing to mine for gold alongside Chinese
immigrants so long as they believed that there was sufficient supply for
all. 24 However, once it became clear that the unlimited wealth in the min-
ing beds was just a myth, Whites began their efforts to exclude the
Chinese from mining work, using laws (e.g., mining taxes), strikes, and
unlawful violence to drive them out.25 As the economic downturn in the
the closing of the Bank of California); Sw, supra note 18, at 49 (noting the mass migration
of workers from the East); Chris Carlsson, The Workingmen's Party and the Dennis
Kearney Agitation, FoUNDSF (1995), http://foundsf.org/index.php?title=The-Workingmen's
_Party_%26_TheDennisKearneyAgitation (last visited Mar. 27, 2012).
20. See Siu, supra note 18, at 44 (noting that the Chinese were imported to work in
California industries via clipper ships from Hong Kong). Jung notes that Chinese immi-
grants came largely from Guangdong province because floods and droughts were
destroying crops there, China was under difficult concessions to foreign powers, and there
was significant civil unrest, including banditry. JUNG, supra note 13, at 3-4.
21. MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 9. In 1852, Governor McDougal endorsed the impor-
tation of Chinese immigrants to drain California's swamplands. Id. Jung notes that Chinese
workers were responsible for creating the levees in the Sacramento River delta which
made it possible for California farmlands to produce such a rich agricultural bountyJUNG,
supra note 13, at 7-8; see also Assemb. Con. Res. 76, 2009 Assemb., Res. Ch. 108 (Cal.
2009), available at http://www.decl7.org/acr _76_bill.pdf (noting the Chinese contribu-
tion to "parting the waters to build the vital levees of the California Delta, and establishing
California's first-class agriculture and fishing industries").
22. MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 84. McClain notes that the mines depended on Chi-
nese laborers to extract gold and the mercury which was used to bond it. Id.
23. See NORTON, supra note 17, at 286 (noting that the Chinese were welcome so
long as gold was plentiful); see also Su, supra note 18, at 48-49 (noting their employment
in the woolen mills and domestic service as well); Dec. 17, supra note 5 (noting that Chi-
nese laborers were employed in the lumber industry, fisheries, and canneries, and
responsible for many of the deltas and levees needed for agricultural and fishery success).
Having few women and children to draw from as in the East, manufacturers also required
the Chinese as workers. Brown & Phillips, supra note 12, at 62.
24. Charles McClain notes that "the first Chinese [immigrants] were greeted with a
mixture of enthusiasm and curiosity," invited to participate in civic ceremonies and lauded
by Governor John McDougal in 1852 as "one of the most worthy classes of our newly
adopted citizens-to whom the climate and the character of these lands are peculiarly
suited. " McCLAIN, supra note 7, at 9 (quoting GUNTHER BARTH, BITTER STRENGTH: A His-
TORY OF THE CHINESE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1850-1870 (1964)); see also NORTON, supra
note 17, at 284-85 (noting that the Chinese were welcome to do "the drudgery of life at a
reasonable wage when every other man had but one idea-to work at the mines for
gold."). Norton also describes how the Chinese were recruited by ship owners who dis-
tributed pamphlets and maps about "the golden hills of California." Id. Indeed, PT. Bar-
Barnum exploited Americans' sense that the Chinese were an exotic curiosity in his shows.
See JUNG, supra note 13, at 8.
25. Brown & Phillips, supra note 12, at 62 (discussing efforts to exclude the Chi-
nese). Siu notes that, perhaps due to this violence, the number of Chinese involved in
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West pushed White Americans into the cities to try their hand at new
occupations, they ran into stiff competition for jobs from skilled Chinese
workers in textile, shoemaking, and cigar-making industries. 26 As a result,
they began to shift part of the blame for their unemployment from the
capitalist claSS27 to the Chinese immigrants who took those jobs.'
As in many other economic downturns in the United States, both
false rumors and angry, ugly diatribes began to circulate about the Chi-
nese. Perhaps most critically, White American workers came to believe the
false tale that the Chinese were "coolie" labor or indentured servants
whose near-slave working conditions were responsible for dragging down
wages for all. 29 White employers competing with Chinese entrepreneurs
were only too happy to contribute to those rumors.30 A Knights of Labor
Pioneer Laundry Workers Assembly flyer emanating from Washington
D.C. typifies the way in which labor leaders exacerbated public fears:
MEN FROM CHINA come here to do LAUNDRY WORK
.... The supply of these men is inexhaustible. Every one doing
this work takes BREAD from the mouths of OUR WOMEN
.... Will you oblige the AMERICAN LAUNDRIES to CUT
THE WAGES OF THEIR PEOPLE by giving your patronage
to the CHINAMEN? * * * If this undesirable element "THE
CHINESE EMIGRANTS" are not stopped coming here ...
the end will be that our industries will be absorbed UNLESS
we live down to their animal life."
mining dropped from 50 percent of the Chinese population in 1861 to 30 percent of the
population in 1870. Siu, supra note 18, at 46-48.
26. Brown & Phillips, supra note 12, at 62.
27. Id. at 74 (noting the strategic way that White employers used the Chinese
against strike threats and in unskilled jobs).
28. See, e.g., id. at 64 (noting that the Chinese were excluded from White labor
movements); Kauer, supra note 18 at 286 (noting that the White labor movement in Cali-
fornia, already suspicious of the capitalist class, blamed their economic hardships on the
Chinese, monopolistic rich landowners, the Central Pacific Railroad (with its significant
ownership of mining stock) and governments corrupted by graft and control by political
bosses); Carlsson, supra note 19 (noting that the Chinese were "scapegoated by white
workers as 'coolie' labor, driving wages downward").
29. McCLAIN, supra note 7, at 11. Even California Governor John Bigler repeated
the incorrect belief that the Chinese were bound to indentured servant contracts (so-
called "coolie labor") that held them hostage. Id.; see also, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 10, at
218 (noting the false rumors that the Chinese were indentured servants). However, Brown
and Phillips note that employers were not interested in switching from Chinese to White
labor because, in addition to their use as bargaining chips with White labor, there were
usually lower training costs associated with the Chinese. Brown & Phillips, supra note 12,
at 63.
30. Brown & Phillips, supra note 12, at 74.
31. THoMAs MAGEE, CHINAS MENACE TO THE WORLD, available at http://
www.sflnuseum.net/loc/magee.htil (last visited on Jan. 27, 2011).
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Unemployed White workers' resentment of Chinese laborers and the
capitalist class reached a fever pitch in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century.32 By 1877, unemployed San Francisco workers were holding
nightly demonstrations around City Hall, often targeted at Chinese im-
migrants." Because the Chinese immigrants had found a strong foothold
in the industry (owning 240 of the 320 known laundries at the time Yick
Wo was arrested for violating the laundry licensing ordinance), Chinese
laundries were a visible target of these riots." On July 23, 1877, a White
mob, fired up by orators at the so-called Sand Lot," marched off to de-
stroy fifteen to twenty-plus Chinese laundries and stone the Chinese
Methodist Mission.3 6 Mob violence against the Pacific Mail Steamship
Line for playing a key role in transporting Chinese immigrant workers
was headed off by a "Pickle-Handle brigade" of 4,000 to 5,000 men or-
ganized by the Committee of Safety, though riots continued to flare for
three more days.3 7 Subsequently, Dennis Kearney, who became the chief
leader of these protesters, marched hundreds of laborers to the Nob Hill
residential district where most of the capitalists lived.3 8
By 1880, crowds of unemployed workers would amass near San
Francisco city hall on a daily basis and march to factories and workshops,
demanding that Chinese workers be fired and asserting their "rights" to
32. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 19, 52-54 (noting the resolutions passed at the July 21,
1877, meeting of the workingmen expressing sympathy for workers rioting in Pittsburgh,
Albany, Chicago, and St. Louis, denouncing the use of military force against them, and
insisting on the abolition of public subsidies to transportation companies and state takeo-
vers of railroad property). Hart also notes the party's call for an eight-hour work day and
Workingmen's Party demands for abrogation of the Burlingame treaty, the abolition of
national banks, and accountability by political office-holders. Id.
33. Id. at 54-55.
34. See Laurene Wu McClain, From Victims to Victors, A Chinese Contribution to Ameri-
can Law: Yick Wo versus Hopkins, in CHINESE AMERICA: HIsToRY AND PERSPECTIVEs 53 (2003),
available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/lG1-98313166.html [hereinafter Wu
McClain]. Danielson suggests that the Chinese had a monopoly on laundries by 1855.
Danielson, supra note 11. The laundry business posed a good opportunity for the Chinese
to own businesses, since they did not need to know English to be successful and the capi-
tal costs of starting a business were low. See Bernstein, supra note 10, at 220.
35. See Hart, supra note 19, at 52-53.
36. See Carlsson, supra note 19; Kauer, supra note 18, at 279 (noting that there was
approximately ten thousand dollars in damage); Wu McClain, supra note 34, at 53. There is
some discrepancy in the reports about how many laundries were destroyed.
37. Carlsson, supra note 19; see also Hart, supra note 19, at 53. Again, there is some
discrepancy in the reports about how many men formed this brigade.
38. See Kauer, supra note 18, at 280; Carlsson, supra note 19 (describing Kearney's
speech in front of Crocker Mansion); Hart, supra note 19, at 53, 59-61 (describing in great




available jobs and necessary occupations." By 1885-86, race rioting and
threats of racial retaliation broke out in Wyoming, Washington, and Ore-
gon as well as other parts of California. 4 Mobs routed Chinese
immigrants out of their homes, burned their dwellings, forced them onto
departing boats, and murdered them without sanction.4 1 On October 24,
1871, a thousand Los Angeles residents took ropes, knives, and pistols to
Chinatown, where they pulled the frightened Chinese from hiding places
and hanged nineteen by the neck.42 The mob then looted Chinese stores
and proudly paraded through the streets, displaying what they had stolen.4 3
Of the 150 men indicted for this assault, only six were convicted, and
those six were quickly released from their sentences.4 4
These riots sparked even more anti-Chinese politics at every level in
California. Dennis Kearney threatened to mobilize followers to use force
if White laborers' demands were not met, and he led with the battle cry,
"The Chinese must go!"45 Kearney's 1878 Workingmen's Party of Cali-
fornia platform declared its intent "to wrest the government from the rich
and restore it to the people" and "to rid the country of cheap Chinese
labor by any means." 4 6 The Workingmen advocated barring Chinese
workers from public works and mercantile professions and prohibiting
them from becoming citizens. 7 The party successfully inserted provisions
into the 1879 California Constitution that prohibited corporations or the
government from employing Chinese workers and denied Chinese immi-
grants property protections.48 They also delegated the removal of Chinese
immigrants from their homes and businesses to cities and clarified that no
Chinese-born citizen could become an elector in California.4 9
39. Carlsson, supra note 19. See also Kauer, supra note 18, at 279 (discussing the pa-
trols and the three naval vessels sent by U.S. authorities to prevent further destruction of
washhouses, docks, and Nob Hill residences).
40. McCLAIN, supra note 7, at 173-76.
41. Id.
42. Siu, supra note 18, at 50.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. MCCLAIN, supra note 7 at 80; see also Hart, supra note 19, at 55 (noting Kearney's
threat to bury San Francisco's elite just as the Russian revolutionaries overthrew Moscow's
aristocracy).
46. Hart, supra note 19, at 55 (quotations omitted).
47. MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 82-83; Kauer, supra note 18, at 284-85.
48. Id. at 284-85.
49. MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 82-83. McClain notes that the successful provisions
were much tamer than those proposed, which would have given the California legislature
the power to remove Chinese imnuigrants from the state, forfeited the charter of any cor-
poration employing foreigners, and denied the right to vote to anyone employing them.
Id. at 81-82. The proposed constitution would also have stripped Chinese immigrants of
the power to sue or be sued in the state's courts and disbarred lawyers who tried to repre-
sent them. Moreover, it would have denied the Chinese trade licenses and the right to fish.
Id.
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With few exceptions, California's governing class did not resist these
nativist movements but instead poured fuel on the flames. From Governor
John Bigler, who in 1852 spoke to the legislature on the evils of Asian im-
migration, 0 to San Francisco's John Miller, who chaired the Committee on
the Chinese in the California constitutional convention,5 1 government offi-
cials lined up against the Chinese. Indeed, in 1879, the ballots of all parties
fielding candidates indicated that they were against Chinese immigration,
and the popular vote against Chinese immigration in San Francisco was
40,030 to 229.52 More ominously in terms of checks and balances, the
chief justice of the California Supreme Court and five of the six associate
justices elected that year were candidates of Kearney's Workingmen's Party,
and some remained on that court as late as 1892.53 That may explain the
uneven record on cases filed in the California Supreme Court, including
the Yick Wo decision handed down in December 1885, which found
against Yick Wo."
Responding to the angry protests over the Chinese presence in the
laundry industry, the mayor and the San Francisco board of supervisors
passed more than a dozen ordinances restricting laundries." These ordi-
nances included maximum-hours regulations aimed at preventing
Chinese laundry owners from working different shifts in shared build-
ings"6 and zoning laws that attempted to push the Chinese laundries away
50. MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 10; see also NORTON, supra note 17, at 287-89.
51. McCAIN, supra note 7, at 81. According to McClain, Miller, a San Francisco
businessmen, was hostile to the Chinese even though he was not a Workingmen's Party
member. Under him, the drafting committee report would have not only prevented fur-
ther Chinese inunigration into the state but also placed resident Chinese "beyond the pale
of the law." Id. One delegate suggested that these provisions would have condemned the
Chinese to starvation in violation of their treaty rights. Id. at 82.
52. Hart, supra note 19, at 57.
53. Id.; see also Kauer, supra note 18, at 287. The California Supreme Court Histori-
cal Society lists the justices elected to the California Supreme Court in 1879 as Robert F
Morrison (Chief, serving until March 1887), Erskine M. Ross (serving until October
1886), John R. Sharpstein (serving until 1892), Samuel Bell McKee (serving until January
1887), Milton H. Myrick (serving until January 1887), and James D. Thornton (serving until
January 1891); they were joined by holdover E.W Kinstry (serving until 1888). History of the
Calfornia Courts, THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT HIsToRIcAL SocIET http://cschs.org/
02_history/02_c.html (last visited March 27, 2012).
54. Examples of hostile rulings include People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854) (exclusion
of Chinese testimony), Ex parte Ah Fook, 49 Cal. 402 (1874), rev'd, Chy Lung v. Freeman,
92 U.S. 25 (1875) (upholding California anti-prostitution immigration statute, and deny-
ing any Fourteenth Amendment relevance), and People v. SS Constitution, 42 Cal. 578
(1872) (upholding the requirement of a bond for incoming passengers). The Court did
overturn some laws, particularly where White economic interests were involved, such as
the 1880 laundry law. MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 280-81; see also Carlsson, supra note 19.
55. See Wu McClain, supra note 34, at 53 (noting that fourteen laundry ordinances
were passed between 1873 and 1884).
56. See Bernstein, supra note 10, at 231-33, 237-39 (noting that a decade after the
U.S. Supreme Court decided Soon Hing v. Crowley, 13 U.S. 703 (1885), denying a habeas
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from their customer base in White residential neighborhoods to sparsely
populated or toxic industrial areas of the city. They also included ordi-
nances intended to harass the Chinese: ordinances prevented the delivery
of laundry with horse-led carriages, rooftop drying racks, and mouth
tubes used to squirt starch on laundry-all practices primarily utilized by
Chinese laundries.5 8
Of more serious concern to their businesses, the supervisors passed
structural ordinances like the one in Yick Wo, which attempted to drive
Chinese launderers out of business altogether, or at least out of town." In
1880, the board of supervisors unanimously passed Order 1569, which
prohibited anyone from maintaining a laundry within San Francisco
County without the consent of the board of supervisors unless the
laundry was constructed of brick or stone.60 Violation of this order was a
misdemeanor, punishable by a $1000 fine and/or up to six months in the
county jail.6 ' As the United States Supreme Court recited, this ordinance
vested the entire discretion for approving laundries constructed with
wood on the supervisors, who subsequently denied all Chinese
petition by a laundryman who violated the 10 p.m. curfew, the supervisors passed another
hours ordinance to protect White women's laundry services). This regulation prohibited
laundry work between 7 p.m. and 6 a.m., although it was invalidated soon after its enact-
ment, only to be replaced in 1912 by a similar ordinance, also upheld, this time by the
California Supreme Court in Ex parte Wong Wing, 138 P. 695 (Cal. 1914). Id. at 239.
These cities also passed ordinances regulating the maximum hours that individual em-
ployees could work. Id. at 237-44.
57. See Bernstein, supra note 10, at 250-62 (describing city zoning ordinances passed
between 1882-1911 that attempted to keep laundries out of suburban areas; confined
them to certain sections of cities or required an operating permit outside of these areas; or
prohibited Chinese immigrants from renting space in buildings not solely used for laun-
dries, a move to drive out small laundries).
58. Id. at 225 n.78 (noting the Los Angeles and Honolulu ordinances passed against
the water tube practice); 224-45 (noting rumors that the Chinese were squirting starch
from their mouths to spread disease and the Los Angeles Times accusation that Chinese
laundrymen were attempting to spread disease with their syphilitic mouth sores); JUNG,
supra note 13, at 76 (discussing an ordinance forbidding laundrymen from carrying laun-
dry on horizontal poles, a practice only the Chinese used); McCLAIN, sipra note 7, at 101
(discussing the 1880 ordinance prohibiting laundry scaffolds on rooftops without supervi-
sor consent, a practice used by Chinese laundries, even though no laundry fires had started
because of the scaffolds).
59. McCuAIN, supra note 7, at 104 (noting that the 1882 ordinance challenged in In
re Quong Woo, 13 F 229, 229 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), which required laundries to get the
consent of twelve neighboring landowners, would be "tantamount to a sentence of death
on a large part of the Chinese laundry industry" and would drive out any laundry within
the laundry district).
60. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1886); Wu McClain, supra note
34, at 54.
61. Wu McClain, supra note 34, at 54.
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applications for licenses and granted all but one of the White owners'
applications.6 2
In light of recurrent violence and scapegoating, Yick Wo's decision3
to challenge the supervisors' regulation by continuing to operate his laun-
dry without a license should surely be enshrined in the annals of civil
disobedience along with the 1960s lunch counter sit-ins. Yet, Yick Wo's
stand was part of a broader response by Chinese immigrants and their
prominent White lawyers who challenged the several forms of discrimina-
tion that governed their lives.6 4 That broad-based attack was a forebear of
the coordinated and planned attacks on racial segregation in the South
that the nation witnessed in the 1950s and 60s.
Among other forms of oppression, the Chinese were the targets of
discriminatory taxes, which they consistently fought in the courts and
legislature as best they could.6 For example, a "miner's tax" had to be paid
by any foreigner (miner or not) who lived in a mining district, targeting
the Chinese in effect if not by name." Similarly, commutation taxes re-
quired ship owners to post a $500 bond (or a payment of $5 to $50 per
passenger) on each Chinese immigrant coming into the country, and
more for mentally ill or disabled passengers..6 The 1862 Chinese police
tax, designed to discourage Chinese immigration, forced all Chinese la-
borers to pay $2.50 per month.6 1
Government policy and law also segregated the Chinese from White
society both figuratively and literally. For example, an 1863 statute pre-
vented Chinese persons from testifying in court against White persons.6 1
62. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 359;Wu McClain, supra note 34, at 53.
63. About 150 launderers agreed to defy the license requirement, and the laundry-
men's guild hired noted lawyer Hall McAllister to represent them. Wu McClain, supra note
34, at 54.
64. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Cian Ping and Fong Yue Ting: The Origins of Plenary
Power, in IMMIGRATION LAw STORIES 9-10 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005)
(describing the "dream team" of elite lawyers representing the Chinese on immigration
cases); McCLAIN, supra note 7, at 3-4 (noting similarity between Chinese and African
American court cases), 279 (noting the cooperation of the Chinese to put together litiga-
tion war chests and the able counsel they employed to represent them).
65. MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 24-29.
66. Id. at 24-25 (describing the miner's taxes); NORTON, supra note 17, at 287 (not-
ing that the Foreign Miners License Tax of 1850 was set at twenty dollars for all
foreigners). This tax was invalidated in Ex parte Ah Pong, 19 Cal. 106 (1861). McCLAIN,
supra note 7, at 24. Professor McClain notes the tax's ironic name: "An Act to Provide for
the Protection of Foreigners, and to define their liabilities and privileges." Id. at 12.
67. McCLAiN, supra note 7, at 12-13 (noting that most ship owners simply paid the
fee and passed it on to their passengers).
68. Id. at 25-29. McClain notes that employers were equally liable for the tax, and
their personal property could be seized for nonpayment of the tax. Id. at 27.
69. Id. at 29; see also infra text accompanying notes 198-201. H6wever, in 1865, the
California Supreme Court in People v. Awa, 27 Cal. 638 (1865) held that this ban did not
prevent the Chinese from testifying against non-White persons. Id.
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There were also attempts to contain Chinese persons within Chinatown
or segregate them into certain other areas of San Francisco," and Chinese
children were turned away from public schools."
After the Chinese Exclusion Acts were passed on the heels of over-
blown rumors of massive immigration fraud, legal Chinese immigrants
fought battles with federal authorities to re-enter the country after they
had left.72 Even native-born Chinese Americans who came back into the
country met challenge after challenge to their citizenship. As an example
of their aggressive fight for citizenship or legal residence, 2,657 habeas
petitions were filed in California federal courts after the Exclusion Acts,
from 1891 to 1905, all protesting detention of immigrants or citizens in
California ports, compared to 273 such petitions filed by European en-
trants on the East Coast.7 3 With the help of the Chinese Six companies
and the Tung Hing Tong trade association," many hired prominent Amer-
ican lawyers and underwrote test cases that challenged discriminatory
legislation as it was passed.7 1 Indeed, the Supreme Court heard seventeen
cases involving Chinese immigrants from 1881-96.76 Moreover, Chinese
70. Id. at 223-25 (discussing the Californian state constitutional provision for re-
moval of Chinese from cities and city attempts to remove the Chinese using the Bingham
ordinance).
71. Id. at 134-44 (discussing school segregation and ensuing litigation).
72. See Dec. 17, supra note 5. In purported execution of its treaty obligations with
China, Congress passed statutes that imposed stringent restrictions on Chinese immigra-
tion in 1882, 1884, 1888, and 1892, the so-called Chinese Exclusion Acts. The Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943) was the first congressional
restriction on immigration, and the 1892 Act finally closed the door to Chinese immigra-
tion. Although upheld in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) and in
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), these acts were eventually rescinded
in 1943. See Denny Chin, Representation for Immigrants: A judge's Personal Perspective, 78
FORDHAM L. REv. 633,636 n.10 (2009).
73. Lucy Salyer, Captives of Lav: judicial Enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Laws,
1891-1905, 76 J. AM. HisT. 91, 92-93 (1989).
74. The Chinese Six Companies is the popular name for the Chinese Consolidated
Benevolent Association, San Francisco chapter, a geographically-organized civic organiza-
tion which served as an immigrant support and social organization for the Chinese. See H.
MARK LAI, BECOMING CHINESE AMERICAN: A HIsTORY OF COMMUNITIES AND INSTITUTIONS,
58-63 (2004). The Tung Hing Hong was a trade organization created by the Chinese to
collect dues, provide for legal costs and fees of its members, resolve member disputes, and
determine where its members could operate. Wu McClain, supra note 34, at 54; see also
Mary Praetzellis, Chinese Oaklanders: Overcoming the Odds, PUTTING THE "THERE" THERE:
HISTORICAL ARCHAEOLOGIES oF WEST OAKLAND (2005), http://www.sonoma.edu/asc/
cypress/finalreport/part3.htm.
75. Wu McClain, supra note 34 (describing Chinese organization of test cases); Saly-
er, supra note 73, at 100 (discussing complaints against the Chinese for hiring the best legal
talent for these cases).
76. See Dec. 17, supra note 5.
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people sent delegations to the state legislature to plead their cases, and
even hired a lobbyist by 1860 to fight discriminatory laws."
Yick Wo and his fellow defendants were not alone in this struggle
against the laundry ordinances. Nor was Yick Wo the first to take a stand,
though his has been described as the perfect test case given his many years
in the business and a clean bill of health from sanitary and other inspec-
tors." Quong Woo was convicted for violating a June 10, 1882 laundry
ordinance" which prohibited the establishment of laundries without
neighbors' consent."o Quong Woo had been a licensed laundryman for
eight years at the time of his arrest and alleged in his habeas petition that
he did not believe he could secure the approval of twelve citizen-
taxpayers on his block,"' presumably because of racial prejudice.
After the ordinance affecting Quong Woo was invalidated and then
re-instituted without the citizen perrussion provision,82 Woo Yeck, Tom
Tong, and Hung Hang challenged the ordinance, apparently for similar
issues.8 3 In Wo Lee, Judges Sawyer and Field invalidated this ordinance as
77. See McCLAIN, supra note 7, at 13-14 and 23-24 (describing the Chinese com-
plaints to the legislature and the hiring of a lobbyist).
78. SeeWu McClain, supra note 34, at 54.
79. See In re Quong Woo, 13 F 229, 230 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882). In Yick Wo, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court noted the series of ordinances on this topic: Order 1569, passed May
24, 1880; essentially similar ordinance 1587 passed July 28, 1880; and Order 1767, adopted
April 8, 1884, which imposed additional licensing conditions in an area bounded by the
intersection of Devisadero Street and San Francisco Bay, across to Channel Street, then to
Potrero Avenue, Dolores Street, to Riley and back again to Devisadero. In re Yick Wo, 9 P.
139, 142-45 (Cal. 1885). This ordinance required laundrymen to get a certificate that the
premises were drained and sanitary, that the machinery was in good condition and not
dangerous, that workers were not laundering between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. or on Sunday,
and that no one on the premises had an infectious disease. Id. at 301-02. Yick Wo argued
that this ordinance had superseded the one under which he had been punished. Id. at
299-300. Although this order repealed all orders expressly in conflict with it, the Court
held that order 1569 was not repealed because it covered only construction and not op-
erations within the laundries. Bernstein, supra note 10, at 244-48; see also Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
80. In re Quong Woo, 13 E 229, 230 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882). Justice Sawyer, who wrote
a similar opinion in In re Wo Lee, articulated concerns about a "slippery slope," noting that
the power claimed by the supervisors could permit them to prohibit cooking stoves, heat-
ers, or restaurants at their pleasure. In reWo Lee, 26 F 471, 474 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886).
81. In re Quong Woo, 13 E at 230.
82. See, e.g., MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 106-07.
83. See Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556 (1883). In Toni Tong, the Supreme Court
focused on the question of whether this proceeding was civil or criminal, which would
give the Court the power to consider a writ of habeas corpus even if there had been no
final judgment in the Circuit Court. Id. at 559. The Court determined that Tom Tong had
brought a suit to enforce a civil right to secure his liberty interest against those holding
him, and held that it did not have jurisdiction. Id. at 560. The opinion in Ex parte Hung
Hang, 108 U.S. 552 (1883), is very cursory in terms of the facts, but the Court denied a
writ because it could not yet exercise appellate jurisdiction, this not being one of the cases
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resting on the arbitrary will of the supervisors and noted that much of the
prohibited 150 square miles was pasture lands, sand banks, and unoccu-
pied islands, where a wooden laundry could cause no harm." Even in the
cases where Chinese laundrymen won, it was not without comment,
however ironically meant, on their outsider status."'
Yick Wo was one of many Chinese laundrymen who had petitioned
the board of supervisors for permission to operate in wooden buildings
after Orders 1559 and 1569 were sustained by California courts.' Despite
his certificate from the health officer and board of fire wardens that his
building was fire safe and properly drained, Yick Wo was denied permission
to operate." On August 22, 1885, he was arrested for operating his laundry
without a permit, convicted in the police court, and imprisoned.' Two days
later, his lawyers filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, which upheld the ordinance on December 29."Yick
Wo's lawyers then turned to Judge Lorenzo Sawyer in the federal Circuit
Court.' HoweverJudge Sawyer concluded that the federal court could not
hear a case first commenced in state court.9' Wo Lee, also convicted and
imprisoned though he had operated for twenty-five years in the same loca-
tion, chose another avenue: he filed a habeas corpus petition directly in the
federal court,92 only to be rebuffed by Sawyer on jurisdictional grounds.9 3
By January 29, 1886, Yick Wo and Wo Lee had both appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court."
In the California Supreme Court's decision in Yick Wo, the question
of equal protection was only a note. Arguing that many individuals have
to give up individual rights that cause "serious mischief to others" so eve-
ryone can enjoy the general benefits flowing from governmcnt, the
California court sustained the ordinance as a familiar fire regulation in a
city where "the danger from fire is ever present and overshadowing."9 5 A
in which the Court had original jurisdiction to issue a writ. McCLAIN, supra note 7, at 324
n.52.
84. In re Wo Le, 26 F 471, 473 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886). This language was also quoted
YickWo, 118 U.S. at 361-62.
85. See In re Quong Woo, 13 E at 230-31.
86. MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 115.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 115, 118.
90. Id. at 119.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 120.
94. Id. at 120-21.
95. In re Yick Wo, 9 P. 139, 141 (Cal. 1885). Admittedly, this pronouncement is
somewhat confusing: "If they prove deficient in these qualifications, the evil cannot be
remedied by invalidating their acts, performed by virtue of authority vested in them, or
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terrible fire had occurred in a Chinese laundry in February 1880,
prompting the supervisors to call for brick or stone laundries and the fire
marshal to claim that the Chinese "were as a race careless in the use of
fire."9 6 However, most witnesses before the supervisors admitted that fires
in Chinatown were no more prevalent than in other parts of the city. One
insurance witness even admitted that the reason his company stopped in-
suring businesses in Chinatown was the company's fear of White arsonists
starting fires there.9 7
The California court conceded that all such legislation is subject to
abuse by officials without "the capacity and integrity essential to a proper
administration of the trust reposed in them," but the court seemed reluc-
tant to invalidate any law because of the lack of these virtues." Rather,
the court disposed of Yick Wo's equal protection claims by citing U.S. Su-
preme Court laundry cases that held that previous laundry ordinances
were uniformly applicable to all laundries, and therefore not unconstitu-
tional." In contrast, the federal court also focused on the potential
confiscation of Chinese property and livelihood in violation of due pro-
cess." To the extent that the federal Circuit Court focused on class
legislation, it directly targeted the economic implications of such legisla-
tion:
[t]he necessary tendency, if not the specific purpose, of this or-
dinance ... is to drive out of business all the numerous small
laundries, especially those owned by the Chinese, and give a
monopoly of the business to the large institutions established
and carried on by means of large associated Caucasian capi-
tal. 101
In contrast to the California Supreme Court's opinion, Federal Cir-
cuit Judge Sawyer's opinion (despite ultimately declining to exercise
jurisdiction) "minced no words" in attacking the ordinance.' 2 Citing
Quong Woo and a similar discretionary Baltimore ordinance on steam en-
gine businesses, Sawyer in Wo Lee acknowledged that the ordinance
where they have exercised discretionary powers, by impugning their judgment or motives,
rather than their right to exercise the discretion." Id. at 299.
96. McCLAIN, supra note 7, at 99.
97. Id.
98. Yick Wo, 9 P at 142.
99. McCuIN, supra note 7, at 110, 118. The cases cited were Barbier v. Connolly,
113 U.S. 27 (1885) and Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885), both authored by
Justice Field sitting on the U.S. Supreme Court.
100. See In re Wo Lee, 26 F 471, 474 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886) (noting the potential for the
"absolute confiscation of the large amount of property shown to be now, and to have been
for a long time, invested in these occupations").
101. Id.
102. McCLAIN, supra note 7, at 119.
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permitted the supervisors to engage in racial discrimination, noting "the
notorious public and municipal history of the times." 03 Indeed, Judge
Sawyer found that the aim of the law, administered as a prohibition
against the Chinese, "must be apparent to every citizen of San Francisco
who has been here long enough to be familiar with the course of an ac-
tive and aggressive branch of public opinion and of public notorious
events."'0 Sawyer introduced the argument that the ordinance violated
the Fourteenth Amendment, a ground later accepted by the U.S. Supreme
Court. "o
U.S. Justice Stanley Matthews' opinion in Yick Wo picked up both
due process property and equality themes, distinguishing the San Francis-
co laundry ordinance from other discretionary laws. He noted that the
law conferred "naked and arbitrary power" without any guidance to en-
sure the rule of law would be obeyed. '6 Though he verged toward
invalidation under the due process clause because of the law's infringe-
ment on a right to occupation, Matthews ultimately rested the Court's
decision on the discriminatory nature of the ordinance; as he stated, there
was no other explanation for the ordinance but "hostility to the race and
nationality to which the petitioners belonged." With that, Justice
Mathews intoned the principle that Yick Wo has become famous for:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in ap-
pearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practical-
ly to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons
in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitu-
tion. 108
Despite the fact that Yick Wo has gone down in the annals of Ameri-
can jurisprudence as an important civil rights case, it was greeted by the
popular press of the time with acrimony." The San Francisco Evening Bul-
letin published a scathing editorial, noting that equal protection was "fine
in theory ... but it could only be based on an equality of habits, acquire-
ments, and tendencies. The problem with the Chinese was that they had
habits and tendencies that made their laundries dangerous.""0 And, in a
parallel to modern-day assaults against Supreme Court "activism," the
103. In reWo Lee, 26 E at 474-75.
104. McCuAIN, supra note 7, at 120 (quoting In reWo Lee, 26 E at 474-45).
105. Id.
106. YickWo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,366-67 (1886).
107. Id. at 366-67.
108. Id. at 373-74.
109. McCAuIN, supra note 7, at 125-26.
110. Id.
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Evening Bulletin attacked the Supreme Court's "judicial Bourbonism,""'
suggesting that the Court was unwilling to concede the facts about the
Chinese.1 12 Indeed, in a claim reminiscent of Justice Scalia's and Thomas's
complaints against Supreme Court "platonic guardians,""' the newspaper
noted ironically, "'[t]he Delphic oracle at Washington intimates that we
can do nothing to bridge the chasm which separates [the Chinese] from
the modern races of men. We can do nothing to elevate or reform them,
for that would be discrimination, contrary to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' "" The newspaper concluded that the only solution was to exclude
the Chinese,"s a view that was even then being implemented by the fed-
eral government, as evinced by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.1"6
II. LESSON ONE: THE COURT SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN WHAT IT
KNows Is EVIL, EVEN IF THE COURT CANNOT FIND A CONSTITUTIONAL
JUSTIFICATION FOR CHALLENGING IT
The first history lesson that Yick Wo and the other Chinese cases
should teach us is that Justice Jackson was right in his Korematsu dissent: it
is better for the Supreme Court not to decide a case than to decide it in
violation of the true meaning and spirit of the Constitution."' Faced with
the choice of invalidating or upholding the constitutionality of President
Roosevelt's 1942 order (backed up by criminal legislation) authorizing
the military to intern Japanese citizens, Justice Jackson chose neither un-
palatable alternative. He confessed that the Constitution could not be read
idealistically to invalidate every unconstitutional military command in a
time of war: the Constitution entrusted wartime decisions to the Executive,
and the need for military success was often immediate."' On the other
hand, the Supreme Court would deal a far worse blow to liberty than the
order itself by validating an unconstitutional government decision premised
111. Ironically, "Bourbonism" is a slur connoting obstinate conservatism. WEBSTER'S
ONLiNE DIcTIONARY, http://www.websters-dictionary-online.com/definitions/bourbonism?
cx= partner-pub-0939450753529744%3Avqd0-tdlq&cof=FORID%3A9&ie=UTF-8&q=
bourbonism&sa=Search#906 (last visited Mar. 27, 2011).
112. MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 126.
113. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 913 (1994) (ThomasJ., concurring) (ob-
jecting to Voting Rights Act interpretation). This reference apparently comes from Judge
Learned Hand's comment, "For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of
Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not."
LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).Justice Black cites Judge Hand in dissent-
ing against the use of due process to strike down a criminal contraception statute in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 526-27 (1968) (Black,J., dissenting).
114. McCLAIN, supra note 7, at 126.
115. Id.
116. See Dec. 17, supra note 5.
117. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244 (1944) (Jackson,J., dissenting).
118. Id.
on racism, panic, or ill-informed decision making. The short-term harm
from the order itself is magnified if racist government action is rational-
ized by the Court as consonant with the Constitution or the Constitution
is rationalized to conform to the order."' Justice Jackson argued,
[Oince a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order ... the
Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrim-
ination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American
citizens. The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon
ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a
plausible claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that
principle more deeply in our law and thinking and expands it
to new purposes.120
Of course, the principle that the Court should not participate in the
justification and implementation of evil depends on two basic premises:
first, the Court must know of the unjust and unconstitutional conditions
facing appellants to the Court, and second, the Court must understand
that these conditions are unjust and evil, given all of the circumstances.
Certainly, as in this case, the law can perpetuate injustice so intrinsically
evil that no amount of immediate social good can conceivably outweigh
it. Yet, we have to acknowledge the rare possibility that an otherwise
seemingly unconstitutional order may be so critical to protecting the
Constitution or security of the nation that a failure to enforce would be
tantamount to a violation of the Court's oath to protect and defend the
Constitution.
In this case, however, the first criterion-knowledge of the pervasive
discrimination-surely had to be met. The United States Supreme Court
during the Yick Wo era had to be familiar with the intentional harm being
visited upon the Chinese in California and elsewhere. Most obviously, Jus-
tice Stephen Field, who sat on the Court from 1,863 to 1897,121 was the
presiding circuit judge in a number of the important Chinese decisions that
came before the lower federal courts in the latter part of the nineteenth
century.'22 Justice Field had previously participated as a California Supreme
119. Id. at 245-46. Justice Frankfurter's diaries suggest that justice Douglas felt that
citizens should be able to prove their loyalty before courts. Justice Black's view was that
the courts could not review anything the military did: if he were in the military, he would
have ignored a court order to return the evacuated Japanese. Justice Black objected to any
reference to the exclusion that might have given enemy "propagandists a lift." FROM THE
DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 251-52 (Joseph P. Lash ed., 1975).
120. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246.
121. Stephen J. Field, THE OYEz PROJECT, http://www.oyez.org/justices/stephen
j-field (last visited January 31, 2011) (noting that Justice Field's faculties had "started to
wane" in his later years).
122. See Christian G. Fritz, A Nineteenth Century "Habeas Corpus Mill": The Chinese
Before the Federal Courts in California, 32 AM.J. OF LEGAL HIsT. 347,348 (1988).
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Court judge in at least some of the early Chinese victories, such as the
invalidation of the Foreign Miners' License Tax.'23 His opinions as a circuit
judge demonstrate his familiarity with the pervasiveness of the racial dis-
crimination occurring in California. A telling example is Justice Field's
opinion as a circuit judge in the previously mentioned In re Quong Woo in
1882, which had to do with a law passed to rid "suburban" residential
neighborhoods of Chinese laundries.'24 In In re Quong Woo, justice Field
demonstrated that he understood that the Chinese were targeted: any
kinds of onerous conditions could be imposed on "some of our worthy
resident aliens from Europe" if the ordinance were constitutional, even if
their businesses were not in themselves "against good morals or contrary
to public order or decency, or dangerous to the public health and safety,"
like laundries.'25 In an apparent jab at the ruling elite in San Francisco,
Justice Field noted that this kind of ordinance could also be applied to
lawyers, bankers, merchants, traders, mechanics, journalists, "indeed, [to] all
brain-workers and hand-workers" whose business could depend upon the
"caprice of others." 2 6 In fact, if the laundry ordinances were lawful, the
supervisors could prohibit almost any person from conducting any busi-
ness on his own property.'27 Justice Field noted that such ordinances "must
be reasonable-that is, not oppressive nor unequal nor unjust in their op-
eration-or they will not be upheld." 128 Even more pointedly, he
remarked that as a Chinese alien protected by treaties, Quong Woo had
the right to pursue any ordinary trade "without let or hindrance . . . ex-
cept such as may arise from the enforcement of equal and impartial
laws." 29
In another case heard by Field, Chy Lung v. Freeman, also known as
the Case of the Twenty- Two Chinese Women, Justice Field in oral argument
expressed his belief that the Chinese women who were refused the right
to immigrate for alleged prostitution were selectively prosecuted because
they were Chinese, something the Fourteenth Amendment forbade.130
Indeed, in the end, the Supreme Court itself invalidated the requirement
that ship owners post a bond before their Chinese passengers could de-
123. See McCIAIN, supra note 7, at 25 (describing Ah Hee v. Crippen, 19 Cal. 491
(1861)).
124. MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 25 (describing In re Quong Woo, 13 E 229, 230
(C.C.D. Cal. 1882)). The law applied to both established and new laundries and the pun-
ishment was steep for a business owner: up to $1,000 in fines in an era when the daily
manufacturing wage for a Chinese immigrant was $1.00 per day. Brown & Phillips, supra
note 12, at 68-69 n.33 (noting that White men in similar jobs made about $2.40/day).
125. In re Quong Woo, 13 F at 231.
126. Id. at 232.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 233.
130. See McCuLN, supra note 7, at 59-61.
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board in the first case involving Chinese litigants to be decided by the
Supreme Court. 3 ' Again sitting as circuit judge,Justice Field decided in In
re Look Tin Sing that an American-born citizen of Chinese parentage did
not lose his citizenship simply because he traveled to China, despite the
U.S. district attorney's claim that an ethnic Chinese man born in the
United States had to have a certificate to deboard just like eligible resident
aliens who traveled to China.132 Reminding the district attorney that the
noncitizen parentage of former slaves and of American-born Chinese res-
idents was irrelevant to their own citizenship,Justice Field went further in
noting that the United States also happily naturalizes those who renounce
their former country and declare themselves willing to be U.S. citizens (so
long, he might have wryly noted, as they are not Chinese).'
California Supreme Court cases also demonstrated the animosity of
the state and local government to the Chinese, and these cases were also
available to the U.S. Supreme Court. People v. Hall was perhaps the worst
of such cases; it upheld a statute that provided, "[n]o Black or Mulatto
person, or Indian, shall be permitted to give evidence in favor of, or
against, any White person.""' In that case, Chief Justice Murray began
with the odd premise that Columbus had confused American natives with
"Mongolians" or "Asiatics" and concluded by saying that the prohibition
against "Indians" testifying was really meant to apply to ethnic Asians."'
He then expressed the worry that if Chinese people could be witnesses,
they would next be voters, jurors, legislators, and judges-an "actual and
present danger" given their refusal to follow the law and racial inferiori-
ty.' Sometimes state legislation was so extreme in its hostility that even
the California Supreme Court, with all of its race prejudice, could not
sustain it. One example was a statute that prohibited Chinese from com-
ing into California at all, invalidated in Ex parte Ah Cue."' Similarly, in Lin
Sing v. Washburn, the California Supreme Court narrowly invalidated a
head tax imposed only on Chinese immigrants designed (as the bill title
states) to get rid of Chinese coolie labor."'
131. Chy Lung v. Freeman (Case of the Twenty-Tvo Chinese Wonen), 92 U.S. 275
(1875).
132. In re Look Tin Sing, 21 E 905, 910 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884); McC.AIN, supra note 7,
at 163-65.
133. In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F at 910.
134. People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 399, 404-05 (1854).
135. Id. at 400-02.
136. Id. at 404-05.
137. Ex parte Ah Cue, 35 P. 556, 557 (Cal. 1894) (invalidating a statute proclaiming
"the coming of Chinese persons into the State, whether subjects of the Chinese empire or
otherwise" is prohibited).
138. Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534 (1862).Justice Field was in the dissent. See Ex
parte Kuback, 24 P. 737, 738 (Cal. 1890) (invalidating an ordinance crirninalizing the em-
ployment of any Chinese persons more than eight hours per day, decided after Yick Wo).
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Governmental hostility was not confined to routine legislation. Even
provisions of California's new constitution had to be struck down for
their clear attempts to target the Chinese, political decisions likely to be
available to the Supreme Court. In In re Tiburcio Parrott, the federal circuit
court invalidated a provision of the new constitution that prohibited Cali-
fornia corporations from employing Chinese resident aliens.' 9 In In re Ah
Up, Judge Lorenzo Sawyer ruled against a California provision that de-
clared Chinese resident aliens ineligible for naturalization.o
Finally, unless members of the Court were scrupulously avoiding the
press altogether, they could not avoid popular references to "the Yellow
Peril,""' the hysterical view that Chinese and other Asian immigrants
would overwhelm Caucasian civilization.142 That was a Los Angeles Times
headline.13 Popular American author Bret Harte also coined the term
"heathen Chinese" to describe the Chinese.144 Some warned that the
Chinese were an immoral lot, involved in gambling, prostitution and opi-
um smuggling, that they kept unsanitary "hovels," and ate unusual food.145
One children's chant, echoing a popular misconception, claimed that the
Chinese ate dead rats "like gingersnaps." 4 6
A more ambivalent pamphlet in circulation expressed the feelings of
admiration and resentment felt by many workers, noting that the Chinese
139. In re Tiburcio Parrott, 1 F 481, 491, 497, 499 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880).Judge Hoffman
decided the case based on inconsistency with the Burlingame treaty. Id. at 494.
140. In re AhYup, 1 F Cas. 223, 224-25 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878) (No. 104).
141. SeeJUNG, supra note 13, at 14.
142. Keith Aoki, The Yellow Pacific: Transnational Identities, Diasporic Racialization, and
Myth(s) of the "Asian Century", 44 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 897, 908 n.34 (2011) (noting that
the Yellow Peril trope "reflected bifurcated fears of white Americans, including: (i) fears of
unfair economic competition; and (ii) fears of racial mongrelization via miscegenation.
From this paranoia, the 'Yellow Peril' stereotype embodied Asians as a threat to Western
civilization in general, and to the U.S. specifically").
143. The Los Angeles Times is credited with an 1886 headline warning of "the Yellow
Peril." See Stanford M. Lyman, The "Yellow Peril" Mystique: Origins and Vicissitudes of a Racist
Dialogue, 13 INT'L J. OF POLITICS, CULTURE & Soc'v, 683, 687, 689-90 (2000); Lisa See,
"Yellow Peril" Fears Still Run Deep, Los ANGELES TIMES, April 29, 2011, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/apr/29/opinion/op-57109/2 (commenting on a survey
in light of remarks suggesting that White Americans still are suspicious of Chinese Ameri-
cans and other imagined aliens); YELLOWFACE!, available at http://yellow-face.com/ (last
visited May 25, 2011). A chilling example of this view is a cartoon of a Chinese man with
a burning torch in one hand, a pistol in the other, and a knife in his distorted mouth,
standing over a fallen and apparently stabbed White woman, with the caption, "The Yellow
Terror in All His Glory." See WEBSTER'S ONuINE DICTIONARY, http://www.websters-
online-dictionary.org/definitions/yellow+peril (last visited Mar. 27, 2012).
144. JUNG, supra note 13, at 18.
145. Id. at 18-19.
146. Siu, supra note 18, at 8; see also Lucy Salyer, Wong Kim Ark: The Contest over Birth-
right Citizenship, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 55-56 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck, eds.
2005) (describing Thanksgiving cartoon of diverse immigrants in which the Chinese man
is piercing a rat with his fork).
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were "remarkable[ly]" hard-working and careful farmers who could live
off small plots of land rented to them at exorbitant prices by White land-
owners.' The pamphlet ends with the note that "[m]an is the only weed
tolerated in China, and he teems everywhere," and that it would be harder
to get population control in China than to Christianize the Chinese.4 8
Another notes that no country can equal China "as an industrial sup-
planter and trade-absorber" since Chinese laborers will work twenty
hours per day to a White man's twelve hours, on "incomparably poorer
food, housing and clothing" and without fresh air or sunshine.149 A third
warns that the Chinaman will learn a trade to "supplant his teachers" in
business through his "industry, suavity and apparent child-like innocence,
seconded by unequaled patience ... keenest business ability" and "disre-
gard of truth."s0
Members of the Court might also have been aware of news reports
of "legislative history" for oppressive bills that the California legislature
passed. For example, during the 1858 passage of a bill to prevent Chinese
immigrants from coming through California ports, a legislative committee
reported that Chinese "habits, manners, and appearance are disgusting in
the extreme,' and noted "that California is peculiarly the country of the
[W]hite man and that we should exclude the inferior races."' Or they
might have read the Evening Post's post-Exclusion Act warning that unless
employers replaced them with "good White workers," Chinese laborers
would still be making clothes, bread, cigars, and shoes for Californians.'52
In national politics, members of the Supreme Court would surely
have noted the post-Reconstruction appeal by West Coast Democrats that
the "Republican doctrine of 'universal equality for all races' would lead to
an 'Asiatic' influx and control of the state by an alliance of 'the Mongolian
and Indian and African. "'"" They might also have been aware of Congres-
sional debates over post-Reconstruction constitutional amendments,
including California Republican senator Cornelius Cole's argument that
if the Fifteenth Amendment were written to include non-Blacks (e.g.,
Asians), it would "kill our party as dead as a stone."'4
147. MAGEE, supra note 31, at 3.
148. Id. at 4.
149. Id. at 6.
150. Id. at 8.
151. MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 18.
152. Id. at 150.
153. ERIC FONER,A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 135 (1990).
154. Id. at 192. On the other hand, Senator William Stewart of Nevada braved popu-
lar hostility to introduce what later became Section 16 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870.
That act prohibited special taxation of immigrants and extended the right to testify to all
persons. MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 37-40. This was despite attacks from the San Francisco
newspaper that Stewart was a "rotten-borough demagogue and panderer to capital." Id. at
40.
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Moreover, persistent Congressional efforts to further restrict Chinese
immigration must have surely impressed the Supreme Court. After the
Burlingame Treaty Amendments in 1880 permitted United States re-
strictions on laborers coming into the country, Congress passed a series of
Chinese Exclusion acts that prohibited the Chinese from becoming natu-
ralized citizens, suspended Chinese laborer immigration for ten years, and
required laborers to have registration documents to come and go from the
United States.' The 1884 Exclusion Act confirmed that Chinese laborers
of any nationality were excluded, expanded the exclusions to include
miners and skilled laborers, and narrowed the favorable treatment provid-
ed merchants."' The law provided that the re-entry certificate would be
the only acceptable evidence permitting laborers visiting China to re-
enter the United States.'17 Unsatisfied, Congress passed the Scott Act in
1888, prohibiting any laborer who left after the effective date of the Act
from ever re-entering the U.S.; the Geary Act in 1892, which extended
the ban on laborers for another ten years and instituted a pass system for
Chinese laborers; and the 1924 Act that prohibited all immigration by
aliens ineligible for citizenship (that is, all Asians.)'
If all of this evidence was insufficient to demonstrate pervasive dis-
crimination against the Chinese, the Court might have followed
Congressional debates over the extension of the Exclusion Acts. A chilling
illustration is the 1890 debate in which members "were regaled with tales
of Asian hordes waiting to inundate the country and of prophecies of the
imminent collapse of Western civilization if new and more radical
measures were not adopted."'- The Court would surely also have been
aware of New York Times reports on the East Coast Chinese community's
mobilization against the Geary Act, which required Chinese to have their
certificate of residence on them at all times,' 60 a "pass" system reminiscent
of modern-day South Africa.'1'
155. See Chin, supra note 64, at 8; Fritz, supra note 122, at 353 (noting that the act
also required Chinese authorities to issue English-language certificates describing and
vouching for merchants, diplomats and other nonlaborers who were permitted to come to
the United States irrespective of the laborer ban).
156. Chin, supra note 64, at 10.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 16-17, 23. Chin notes that in 1924, the right to immigrate was tied to the
right to naturalization, which essentially tied it to race since Asians were racially excluded
from naturalization. Gabriel J. Chin, Tie Civil Rights Revolution Conies to Imnigration Law:
A New Look at tie Imnigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REv. 273, 281-82
(1996). Racial exclusion policies were upheld as late as the mid-1960s in Hitai v. INS, 343
F2d 466 (2d Cir. 1965). Chin, supra note 64, at 23.
159. MGCLAIN, supra note 7, at 202.
160. Id. at 203, 205-06.
161. See, e.g., NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM 83 (1994) (noting that
African children live in African-only societies, and an African can "be stopped at any time
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Despite this clear evidence of malignant intention by authorities and
legislatures from local to national levels, the U.S. Supreme Court did not
take any significant lead in responding to anti-Chinese sentiment. Alt-
hough, as suggested, it did overrule some state legislation as in Yick Wo,
the Court's interpretation of federal immigration law "piled on" to the
discrimination experienced by the Chinese at the state level. For example,
in United States v. Wong You, a Chinese laborer who had entered the coun-
try in violation of the Chinese Exclusion Acts claimed that he had to be
deported under earlier, more fulsome procedures for Chinese deportation
rather than later, swifter, general deportation laws.162 Justice Holmes de-
murred, noting that the whole purpose of the earlier law was to ensure
that the Chinese would indeed be deported, and concluding that it would
be illogical to give the Chinese essentially more rights to deportation due
process than other deportees on the strength of an earlier law that deport-
ed only them.1 63
The Chinese cases offer an important footnote: the federal courts'
track record in protecting civil rights of minorities is not necessarily de-
pendent upon how "enlightened" judges' personal views of the minorities
in question may be. The fact that justices are often affected by the social
and political times may be an explanation-but it is not an excuse-for
their failure to ensure the civil rights of all. The Chinese cases are a telling
example of how personal prejudice of a federal judge does not prevent
him or her from enforcing the basic commands of the Constitution
against hostile legislation. Justice Field, a key player at both the trial and
the appellate level in the Chinese cases, expressed the clear opinion that
Chinese immigration was unwise, noting in In re Ah Fong that "the dis-
similarity in physical characteristics, in language, in manners, religion and
habits, will always prevent any possible assimilation of them with our
people."'164 That was not the only time he expressed misgivings about the
Chinese as immigrants.' 5 Indeed, some have credited him with the pro-
posal to enact the first Chinese Exclusion Act. 66
of the day or night and be ordered to produce a pass, failing which he will be arrested and
thrown in jail").
162. United States v.WongYou, 223 U.S. 67 (1912).
163. See id. at 69. Similarly, the Court refused to accept the uncontroverted testimo-
ny that Quock Ting was American-born. Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417
(1891).
164. See Fritz, supra note 122, at 352 (1988) (quoting In re Ah Fong, 1 F Cas. 213
(C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No. 102)).
165. See, e.g., id. at 364, for his exchange with the attorney for Chew Heong, who
left for China before the federal registration certificates were available, and thus, like per-
haps 12,000 to 15,000 of his countrymen, could not establish his right to return to the
United States under the 1884 act. In that exchange, Field noted "[i]f they [the Chinamen]
do not come back at once they should not be allowed to come at all."
166. Id. at 363.
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Yet, while his record was not consistently in favor of the Chinese-
particularly after Congress gave him more authorization to justify rulings
against them-in many cases Justice Field invalidated laws on what we
would now call equality grounds. In In re Ah Fong, despite his comments,
Justice Field struck down a state law prohibiting Chinese immigrants
from landing.' Perhaps most dramatically, in the Case of the Twenty- Two
Chinese Women,' 8 Justice Field objected to differential treatment of Chi-
nese and White American prostitutes, arguing that while "the State can
exclude all dangerous persons, [t]he idea is that whatever protection the
law gives shall be uniform and shall extend to all classes."'69 In other cases
early in his career, he sided with the Chinese as well.co
Similarly, Judge Hoffman, who decided many of these cases for the
Chinese, was strongly negative about Chinese immigration. He once not-
ed that the flood of Chinese labor not only harmed native labor, but also
menaced "our interest, our safety, and even our civilization.""' While he
was deeply hurt by popular criticism of his opinions and wearied by the
large number of these cases he had to decide,'72 his sense of judicial duty
drove him to decide cases as he believed the law required. Indeed, prior to
passage of the Chinese Restriction Acts,Judges Sawyer and Hoffman were
accused of "playing with" and creating "loopholes" in federal immigration
laws that benefitted the Chinese.7 1 Judge Hoffman continued to hold for
the Chinese even after Field found sanction in the Exclusion Acts to start
holding against them.7 4 (By contrast, Justice John Harlan, the dissenting
civil rights hero of Plessy v. Ferguson,"' consistently treated the Chinese
167. Id. at 352 (quoting In reAh Fong, 1 F Cas. 213 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No. 102)).
168. See MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 59 (describing Justice Field's remarks at oral ar-
gument).
169. Id. (quoting Justice Field's remarks in Morning Call, Sept. 18, 1874, p. 1, col. 7).
McClain notes that some newspaper accounts suggest Field's belief that the Fourteenth
Amendment nationalized the Bill of Rights. Id. at 59 n.71.
170. See Fritz, supra note 122, at 349, 354 (citing Field's rulings in In re Ah Sing, 13 F
286 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) and In re LowYam Chow, 13 F 605 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882)).
171. Id. at 355 (quoting In re LowYam Chow, 13 F 605 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882)).
172. Id. at 356, 358-59. Ironically, the collectors were depicted as heroes in the
popular press, as "'striving hard' to prevent frauds and the landing of 'bogus coolies' [who]
found themselves opposed by 'every Chinaman in the city, the Chinese Consulate, dozens
of purchased lawyers and untoward circumstances enough to make them sicken of their
task.'" Id. at 359 (quoting San Francisco Alta California, Dec. 18 1883).
173. Id. at 360.
174. Id. at 349, 363-366 (describing Field's remarks in the case of Chew Heong).
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed Field on the basis that his fellow judges, Hoffinan and
Sawyer, had dissented-namely, that Chinese residents could not be expected to produce a
certificate that was not even available when they left the country. Id. at 365.
175. 163 U.S. 537,552 (1895) (Harlan,J., dissenting).
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with animosity, noting in Plessy that "[t]here is a race so different from our
own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens."11 6 )
As suggested earlier, the Court may also decide that a case manifests
constitutional evil that is yet not as serious as the evil to be prevented by
the statute, such as the protection of the nation. Certainly, there are any
number of constitutional cases, including Korematsu, where the Court
seems troubled by the prospect that basic civil rights are being violated
and yet concludes that the evil to be prevented by the law strongly out-
weighs the particular harm to individuals."' Korenatsu's pronouncement
that, in wartime, civil liberties of some must give way to the protection of
all is echoed by the Court in many of the wartime First Amendment cas-
es.178
In retrospect, the thought that Chinese immigration might offer a
similar parallel to the feared Japanese or German invasion of American
shores in World War II seems absurd to modern ears. But, in fact, this
sense of dread about the hordes of immigrants who were flooding the
country and "threatening civilization" was not limited to federal judges.
The newspapers and politicians of the day took up this cause and fed the
public fear that the Chinese were the cause of all kinds of social evils that
they had nothing to do with. In 1856, a California legislator compared
the Chinese miners to the plague of locusts that visited Egypt."' One can
see this kind of panic in modern commentaries on illegal immigration,
where Mexican migrants evading the border fence are equated with al-
Quaeda terrorists and accused of everything from starting epidemics to
176. Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth:justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IowA L.
REV. 151, 156 (1996) (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 561 (Harlan,J., dissenting)); see also Unit-
ed States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705-07 (1898) (HarlanJ., dissenting) (expressing
Justice Harlan's desire to strip citizenship from a native-born American of Chinese eth-
nicity); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 595
(1889) (demonstrating Justice Harlan's agreement with the Court's opinion that it seemed
"impossible for [the Chinese] to assimilate with our people or to make any changes in
their habits or modes of living").
177. See, e.g., United States v. Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 219-20 (1944) (noting
"that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immedi-
ately suspect," and that "[c]onpulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their
homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our
basic governmental institutions. But when, under conditions of modern warfare, our
shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with
the threatened danger.").
178. See, e.g., Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 208 (1919) (upholding convic-
tion for preparation of German language newspaper encouraging refusal of duty during
World War I); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (upholding conviction
under Espionage Act); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216-17 (1919) (upholding
conviction for statements opposing war under Espionage Act of 1917).
179. McCIAIN, supra note 7, at 18.
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creating "stealth citizens," i.e., "anchor babies.""'o And the political pander-
ing to the fear of "Chinese coolie labor" can be seen everywhere in this
period, from Dennis Kearney's speeches on the sandlots of San Francis-
co... to the pronouncements of the President and key Congressmen. 18 2 We
can also see resounding echoes of the serious economic structural prob-
lems that the United States faces today, including significant wealth
disparities, great distrust of bankers and capitalists, the willingness of im-
migrants lured by employers to take low-wage labor jobs, and job
displacement caused by the disappearance of key industries.' Some histo-
rians have argued that the Chinese cases represent a major struggle
between the federal government and the states over who would have the
power over imnigrants and the responsibility for the issues created by
immigration,184 an argument not dissimilar to today's immigration debates.
Then, as now, immigrants serve as an easy and visible group to blame for
the failure of both federal and state government to acknowledge that our
voracious need for immigrants, often to do our dirty work, has to be bal-
anced with responsibility for its effects, both on the immigrants
themselves and on the wider community.
However, Korematsu and the Chinese cases are perhaps the cases that
prove the rule. Perhaps the most poignant evidence of what can occur if
we disregard the history of the Chinese exclusion period is United States v.
Dennis, the case justifying the punishment of small Communist cells for
teaching the overthrow of the government. In that case, the Court cites
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, the Chinese Exclusion case, for the
proposition that:
The right of a government to maintain its existence-self-
preservation-is the most pervasive aspect of sovereignty ....
To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign
aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every na-
tion, and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are
to be subordinated. It matters not in what form such aggres-
sion and encroachment come . . . .11
180. For an extended discussion of these parallels, see Marie A. Failinger, Recovering the
Face-to-Face in American Immgration Law, 16 S. CAL. REV. L & Soc. JusT. 319, 327-44
(2007).
181. See Carlsson, supra note 19 (describing Kearney's violent rhetoric).
182. See, e.g., Salyer, supra note 73, at 98 (noting the statement of Senator William
Stewart in 1892 that the American people are now convinced that the Chinese cannot be
assimilated).
183. Brown & Phillips, supra note 12, at 73-75.
184. See Chin, supra note 6, at 1378 (stating that the conflict arose as a struggle be-
tween California and the federal government to control immigration from Asia).
185. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519 (1951) (citing Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889)).
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The nineteenth century Supreme Court's validation of hysterical
fears that Chinese immigrants, like small Communist cells, were ready to
engulf the country should give the modern Court pause before it vali-
dates similar hysterical fears taken up by Congress, the Executive, or a
state. In case after case where the Court has thrown its weight behind
Congressional or Executive decisions to repress civil liberties, history has
determined that there is often more smoke than fire behind governmental
excuses for suppressing liberties-from the anti-syndicalism acts of the
early 1920s18 6 to the detention of Guantanamo Bay detainees.'
Thus, Justice Jackson has been proven right: the Court should be
wary when it finds itself pulled into a battle in which civil liberties or
basic constitutional principles are going to be victims of social and eco-
nomic fear and resentment. If after searching precedents and souls, the
Supreme Court justices believe that they cannot legitimately or effectively
stand up for the civil liberties of immigrants and other minorities, the
Court will do less damage by denying certiorari rather than by giving
sanction to the government's effort which is bound to do evil. As Justice
Jackson rightly warned, any precedent against civil liberties lies around
like a loaded gun to be used during the next anxious historical moment
to thwart the human rights of another group.18 8
III. LESSON TWO:THE COURT'S CONSISTENTLY FAITHFUL ATTENTION TO
INJUSTICE FROM CASE TO CASE IS IMPORTANT, BECAUSE ONLY SUCH
SUSTAINED ATTENTION IN CASE AFTER CASE Is LIKELY TO HAVE A POSITIVE
IMPACT ON THE COURSE OF FREEDOM AND EQUALITY
A tempting position for the Supreme Court to take is that it decides
only the cases before it, and, like a common law court, its only obligation
to future decisions is to take an adequate account of past case precedent.
It is particularly tempting for the Court to take this stance as a defensive
response to popular cries of judicial activism. However, a comparison of
the Court's action in the civil rights cases to its response in the Chinese
cases demonstrates that only a Court that is persistent in fighting injustice
in case after case will make a real difference for persecuted minorities.
Despite the painful slowness of the Court's commitment to the
186. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 US. 357, 371 (1927) (upholding conviction
for participation in Communist Labor Party under California Criminal Syndicalism Act);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,668-71 (1925) (upholding conviction of Socialist Party
member under NewYork criminal anarchy law).
187. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Runisfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567-68 (2006) (holding that the
military tribunals set to try Hamdan for being an al-Qaeda bodyguard and driver violated
the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions).
188. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 244, 246 (1944) (Jackson,J., dissenting). See
generally Robert Jackson, The Task of Maintaining our Liberties: The Role of tie Judiciary, 39
A.B.A.J. 961,963 (1953).
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elimination of segregation in the South, after Brown v. Board of Education'"
the Court was unremitting and relatively comprehensive until the mid-
1970s, which paid off. In case after case the Supreme Court went out of
its way to reject subterfuges created to avoid school desegregation, such as
closure of public schools combined with public support of private schools,
"local school" options, and plain intransigence." The Court also rejected
other government attempts to enforce segregation on busses,"' in vot-
ing,'92 on juries,"1 3 and in personal relationships."'
Moreover, the Court went out of its way to protect the nascent civil
rights movement as much as it could. The Court rejected attempts to
break the NAACP, squelching suits against the NAACP for damages for
libel,' attacks on the organization for stirring up civil rights litigation,
and attempts to expose its membership to public retaliation.'96 The Su-
preme Court also went well beyond "business as usual" in supporting the
civil rights movement, shielding movement participants with whatever
doctrines it could validly muster. During the height of the civil rights era of
the 1960s, the Supreme Court decided almost two dozen cases involving
189. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
190. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (invalidating public text-
book loan program to private schools in district where White students had fled public
schools); Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (invalidating plan requiring students
to choose between previously all-Black and all-White schools at first and eighth grade,
and assigning student to previous segregated school if no election was made); Griffin v.
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (invalidating school board's decision to close all public
schools to avoid integration); Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (invalidating school
transfer plans that permitted students to transfer only to schools where they were in the
racial majority).
191. See Bailey v. Patterson, 369 US. 31 (1962) (holding unconstitutional enforced
racial segregation on interstate busses); Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964) (holding constitutional the Civil Rights Act of 1964 sections prohibiting
discrimination in public accomnodations).
192. See, e.g., Gaston Cnty. v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (upholding district
court finding that county literacy test for voting violated Voting Rights Act of 1965);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (invalidating racial gerrymandering).
193. See, e.g., Eubanks v. State, 356 U.S. 584, 585 (1956) (invalidating almost complete
exclusion of Blacks from grand jury pool and noting "unbroken line of cases" since
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (establishing invalidity of excluding Negroes
from grand or petit juries)).
194. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that Virginia's miscegenation
statute was unconstitutional); McLaughlin v. State, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (striking down
cohabitation statute applying only to relationships between Black men and White women
or White men and Black women under the equal protection clause).
195. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 264 (1964); see also TAYLOR BRANCH,
PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARs 42-46 (1998) (describing the use of the libel
suit to punish the civil rights protests).
196. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (invalidating attorney solicitation
statute applied against NAACP to forestall further desegregation litigation); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that requiring the NAACP to disclose its member-
ship list violated members' right to privacy in their associations).
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sit-ins and protests. In each case, until Adderley v. Florida,'7 the Court ex-
ercised robust and searching judicial review, invalidating virtually all of
these convictions. The grounds it utilized to invalidate state laws were
breathtakingly eclectic, ranging from constitutional (equal protection and
First Amendment) and statutory (the new Civil Rights Acts) grounds to
flat-out rejection of the lower court's evidence as insufficient under state
law.'" The full effect of the Court's patient and consistent rejection of
attempts to evade the desegregation implications of Brown or to frighten
and punish civil rights protesters can probably not be measured with any
degree of certainty. However, it is clear that principal actors in the deseg-
regation conflict believed the Court was having a significant effect. For
example, in a statewide television address during the 1964 presidential
campaign, Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina accused the
Democratic Party of protecting "the Supreme Court in a reign ofjudicial
tyranny." 9 9
In the Chinese cases, on the other hand, it often fell to federal dis-
trict court judges-particularly those in California-to protect the
Chinese against both the blatant illegality of local officials and grudgingly
restrictive readings of federal immigration laws. To be sure, the Chinese
won some early cases in the state courts: the capitation tax, 200 the police
tax, 201 the miner's tax,202 and the 1856 enactment prohibiting Chinese
197. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
198. As just a sample of the legal bases for these cases, see, e.g., Boynton v. Virginia,
364 U.S. 454 (1960) (holding invalid under the Interstate Comnmerce Act the arrest of
Black law student who sat in at a bus terminal restaurant); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S.
157 (1961) (invalidating arrests at lunch counter protest on the basis that conduct was
insufficient to support a conviction); Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962) (holding that
defendants could not be arrested for violating a non-statutory segregation custom of sepa-
rate waiting rooms under the equal protection clause); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378
U.S. 347 (1964) (invalidating conviction on due process grounds because state Supreme
Court's construction of statute gave no fair warning to defendants sitting in at luncheon-
ette).
199. BRANCH, supra note 195, at 493.
200. See McCLAIN, supra note 7, at 17-18. In 1857, the California Supreme Court
held in People v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169 (1857), that the capitation tax was an interference
with the federal government's power to regulate foreign commerce. Id. at 18.
201. See McCLAIN, supra note 7, at 25-28. In Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534
(1862), the California Supreme Court invalidated this tax of $2.50 per month on all non-
business-owning Chinese residing in California, except those who worked in the mines or
made sugar, rice, coffee or tea. Id. at 26-27. Once again, the court relied on federal law to
determine that the police tax interfered with federal power over foreign commerce. Id. at
28.Then-ChiefJustice Field dissented from this ruling on the police tax. Id. at 29.
202. As previously noted, in Ex parte Ah Pong, 19 Cal. 106 (1861), the California
Supreme Court invalidated an 1861 amendment to the foreign miners' license law that
required any foreigner living in a mining district but ineligible to be a citizen (that is, the
Chinese) to pay a miners' tax. The California Court held that Ah Pong, a laundryman,
could not be subject to a tax specifically named the "Foreign Miners License Tax."
McCLAIN, supra note 7, at 24. In an opinion written by then-California Supreme Court
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immigrants from landing in California were all invalidated.203 However,
perhaps the most significant demonstration of the California Supreme
Court's views about the Chinese cause was Justice Hugh Murray's opin-
ion in People v. Hall.2 04 Justice Murray said of the Chinese that their
"mendacity is proverbial" and their race was by nature marked "as infe-
rior ... and incapable of progress or intellectual development beyond a
certain point."2 05 And there were other cases that more indirectly displayed
that same attitude. For example, in People v. Williams, the California Su-
preme Court sustained defendant's offer of testimony for the "notorious
fact" that "Chinese are in the habit of resisting forcibly the collection of
taxes, and that all collectors feel compelled to go armed for the purpose
of resisting the assaults of the Chinese."2 6 Although the Chinese won
some cases in the California Supreme Court,207 the court certainly could
not be counted on to protect the Chinese against all discriminatory legis-
lation.208
In such an atmosphere, the federal courts provided a welcome alter-
native avenue of relief. While most of the nonimmigration cases were
resolved in state court, the federal courts provided some protection for the
Chinese as well. For example, San Francisco's "minimum airspace" lodg-
ing house ordinance targeted at the Chinese was enforced by police using
ladders to enter Chinese boarding houses in the middle of the night.209
Even while Judge Hoffman was reluctant to overturn the ordinance on its
face, he scolded San Francisco about the need for even-handed enforce-
ChiefJustice Field, that court also affirmed in Ah Hee v. Crippen, 19 Cal. 491 (1861) that
the tax collector could not replevin a horse for miner's license taxes allegedly owed by a
person mining on private property without a license. Id. at 25.
203. See MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 18.
204. 4 Cal. 399, 404-05 (1854).
205. Id. at 405; see also People v. Chew Wing Gow, 52 P. 657 (Cal. 1898) (granting a
new trial to a Chinese immigrant on grounds of insufficient evidence, however, the Court
cites at length from the district attorney's comments: "[1]ike all other Chinese murder
cases, this cause abounds in perjury .... If, however, new trials are to be granted because
perjury exists in a Chinese case ... then we may as well close our courts to the trial of all
Chinese cases and save the expense to the county.").
206. See People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 142, 142-43, 147 (1860) (objecting to the charac-
terization of a Chinese person murdered by a tax collector as a "victim").
207. McCLAIN, supra note 7, at 29, 139-42 (discussing People v. Awa, 27 Cal. 638
(1865) (holding that Chinese people could testify against anyone but White people), and
Tape v. Hurley, 6 P 129 (Cal. 1885) (holding that, under a statute that required the schools
to be open to "all children,' a Chinese child could not be excluded based on her race
from San Francisco schools)).
208. See, e.g., MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 108; 118-19 (noting the California Supreme
Court's decision to uphold the laundry licensing ordinances, including that at issue in Yick
W) .
209. McCLAIN, supra note 7, at 65-66.
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ment of the law.210 When Judge Hoffman heard the lodging house case, he
was so disgusted that he all but invited the Chinese to challenge a related
ordinance which called for county jail inmates to have their hair shorn.21 1
That ordinance was intended to humiliate the Chinese wearing queues
(pig-tails) or to pressure them into paying fines in lieu of (presumably
costly to the city) imprisonment for violation of the various ordinances
directed at them.2 12 Similarly, in Chy Lung v. Freeman,213 justice Miller not-
ed that "a silly, an obstinate, or a wicked commissioner may bring disgrace
upon the whole country, the enmity of a powerful nation, or the equal
loss of an equally powerful friend."2 14
Where immigration was concerned, the lower federal courts were
critical and persistent actors in protecting the passage rights of Chinese
immigrants. Between 1882, when the first Chinese Exclusion Act was
passed by Congress, and 1890, Chinese travelers filed 7,080 habeas peti-
tions to challenge the decisions of the San Francisco collector in charge of
deciding which Chinese travelers were going to be allowed to enter the
United States. 215 Of those, the Chinese won about eighty-five to ninety
percent.2 They were so successful that Congress finally eliminated the
right to judicial review for administrative immigration decisions, a legisla-
tive move ratified by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1892.217
The immigration cases demonstrate that the federal district judges,
including Judges Hoffman and Sawyer, took the writ of habeas corpus
210. See id. at 44-45, 65-69 (noting that though the challengers lost because they
failed to prove that the law was being enforced on a discriminatory basis, the court still
admonished the city that it had to enforce the ordinance impartially). The anti-Chinese
movement consistently focused on overcrowding and unsanitary conditions in the Chinese
district, making sensational reports such as the claim that as many as forty Chinese men
occupied a single room, and describing the Chinese as "a moral leper in our community."
Id. at 302-03 n.5.
211. Id. at 69, 74 (noting that Justice Field held the ordinance invalid as a special
punishment).
212. Id. at 65.
213. 92 U.S. 275 (1875) (invalidating bond requirement for immigrants on ships).
214. Chin, supra note 6, at 1379 (quoting Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 279).
215. Salyer, supra note 73, at 92. Salyer notes that 2,657 habeas petitions were filed in
San Francisco between 1891 and 1905, even after Congressional restrictions on judicial
review. Id. at 93. By contrast, only 273 habeas petitions were filed by the primarily Euro-
pean imnigrants entering at Ellis Island between 1891 to 1910. Id. at 92. Chinese
immigrants were significantly more likely to be denied admission, with 5 to 34 percent
excluded in the years between 1894 and 1901, respectively, as compared to 1.3 percent of
non-Chinese applicants. Id. at 93.
216. Id. at 92.
217. Id. at 92; see also McClain, supra note 7, at 169-71 (discussing the In re Jung Ah
case, involving a stolen certificate, and noting the San Francisco district judges' "insistence
that the treaty of 1880 be taken seriously"). Salyer notes that because of previous treaty
interpretations, Chinese inunigrants ironically retained the right to judicial review longer
than others. Salyer, supra note 73, at 93-97.
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and the evidentiary requirements of the law very seriously.218 Jung Ah
Lung, returning from China, claimed that his right-of-return certificate
had been stolen by pirates.Judge Hoffman granted him habeas corpus on
the strength of customs records and testimony of three witnesses over the
objection of the United States, which claimed that only the certificate
was valid evidence of his residence .2 1 When the collector challenged the
right of the Chinese to apply for habeas corpus in In re Jung Ah Lung,220
Judge Hoffman replied that
[A]n abrogation of the writ of habeas corpus, which has always
been considered among English-speaking peoples the most sa-
cred muniment of personal freedom, must be unmistakably
declared by [C]ongress before any court could venture to
withhold its benefits from any human being, no matter what
his race or color.221
Salyer notes, however, that perhaps due to the large number of habe-
as cases filed by the Chinese, the due process afforded Chinese immigrants
and citizens attempting to enter was far less than that afforded criminal
defendants. 222 Petitioners were brought before the U.S. attorney to give a
statement (admissible against the petitioner in court) without their law-
yers, then released on bail. Officials widely believed that the Chinese and
their witnesses lied in the proceedings, having "no regard for an oath"
according to U.S. attorney John P. Carey, who also labeled the proceedings
"novel and strange."223 Both the collector and the U.S. attorney cross-
examined petitioners and witnesses at length, trying to find holes in their
cases that would jeopardize their claim.224 Judge Hoffman suggested that
this was a "Star Chamber" proceeding that was probably illegal but neces-
sary to handle all of the cases that were coming before the court.2 5
218. Salyer, supra note 73, at 94.
219. McCLAIN, supra note 7, at 169-70; In re Jung Ah Lung, 25 F 141 (D. Cal. 1885),
af'd, United States v.Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621, 628-32 (1888).
220. 25 F 141 (D. Cal. 1885).
221. Salyer, supra note 73, at 102 (quoting In rejung Ah Lung, 25 E at 142-43). Salyer
notes that the Chinese Inspector S. J. Ruddell suggested to a congressional subcommittee
that the writ of habeas corpus be taken away from the Chinese, which would solve the
problem of immigration. Id. Sen. Watson C. Squire responded, "that would be a little inim-




225. Id. at 103 (quoting In re Jung Ah Lung, 25 F at 142-43, af'd, United States v.
Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621, 628-32 (1888)). Salyer notes that this practice was probably
dropped by the 1890s in favor of a system in which the Chinese cases were referred to a
U.S conunissioner who tried the case de novo in an informal hearing, with the comnis-
sioner often encouraging petitioners to bring more witnesses. Again, there was vigorous
cross-examination of Chinese witnesses, including requests for minute details about their
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Due to increasingly restrictive Exclusion Acts passed in 1882, 1884,
and 1888, and to the United States' 1880 amendment of the 1868 Burlin-
game treaty with China, the only Chinese who could enter the United
States were nonlaborers such as merchants, students, and travelers. 226 How-
ever, the federal courts in California had to contend with a number of
administrative measures that interpreted those laws in such a way as to
limit the flow even of immigrants permitted to enter under the treaty. In
one blatantly racist response, the federal court had to turn back the col-
lector's challenge to the right of ethnic Chinese people who had been
born in the United States to return after a journey to China, a battle
which the government lost in 1898 when the U.S. Supreme Court de-
clared that they were indeed citizens in Wong Kim Ark.227 In a telling
Catch-22, after the 1882 act required Chinese laborers leaving the United
States for visits to China to get identification certificates from customs
collectors to present on their return to the United States,228 the federal
court had to overrule the San Francisco collector when he refused to ad-
mit those Chinese resident aliens without certificates who had left for
visits even before the certificate requirement became law and therefore
had no way of getting a certificate. 229
Furthermore, the collector even mounted challenges to Chinese la-
borers' claims that they had not left the United States (and therefore did
not need a return certificate.) Thus, for example, Justice Field (sitting as
circuit justice) and Judge Sawyer had to issue a habeas writ to a Chinese
cabin waiter, Ay Sing, while he was onboard the City of Sydney. Ah Sing
left his U.S. port eight days before the immigration commissioner started
issuing certificates to returning Chinese immigrants and never left the
ship at any of its foreign ports of call.2" Justice Field agreed that Ah Sing
never left the jurisdiction of the United States, and in later cases, further
ruled that crewmen did not lose their residence in the United States
because they took a few hours of shore leave in foreign ports. 23 1 Other
trips such as how many steps there were out of the petitioner's back door, where the peti-
tioner sat in the village schoolhouse, and whether the petitioner's mother had bound feet.
Id. at 103-04.
226. Id. at 97.
227. 169 U.S. 649, 673 (1898) (holding that persons born in the United States of
resident alien Chinese parents were citizens of the United States by virtue of the Four-
teenth Amendment).
228. MCCL.AIN, supra note 7, at 149.
229. See, e.g., In re Chin Ah On, 18 F 506, 507 (D. Cal. 1883); McCIAIN, supra note 7,
at 151, 157. Even after the 1884 amendments,Justices Sawyer and Hoffman had to release
thirty laborers who left the United States before the 1882 acts and were refused landing
upon their return because they could not produce collector's certificates. See In re Ah
Quan, 21 F 182,184 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884); McCLAIN, supra note 7, at 160-61.
230. In re Ah Sing (Case of the Chinese Cabin Waiter), 13 E 286, 288-89 (C.C.D. Cal.
1882); McCI.AIN, supra note 7, at 152.
231. MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 152-53.
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immigration cases decided in favor of the Chinese include Judge Hoff-
man's ruling that the son of a Chinese merchant immigrating to work in
his father's business was not meant to be excluded by the Exclusion Act,232
and Justice Field's early ruling that American-born persons of Chinese
descent were U.S. citizens. 233
Similarly, the California federal judges were required to beat back
numerous hostile administrative interpretations of what evidence was ac-
ceptable in support of a Chinese petitioner's claim that he had the
appropriate status to land. After the federal exclusion of Chinese laborers
in the 1882 act, non-laborer Chinese immigrants were required to obtain
certificates from the Chinese government attesting to their merchant or
student status. However, the San Francisco Customs collector refused to
admit a Chinese immigrant because he did not have the so-called Canton
certificate, even though he had other evidence of his merchant status. 234 In
Justice Field's opinion, the 1880 revision of the Burlingame Treaty and
1882 Act only modified the United States' commitment to free entry of
Chinese laborers. Therefore, he held that refusing a Chinese merchant
entrance because he could not produce his Chinese government identifi-
cation certificate was a clear violation of the United States' commitment
to China. 235
We should not, however, glorify lower federal court intervention too
much; although the federal district court was often the champion of the
Chinese, over time the federal judges became "quite hard-nosed about
interpreting the law."236 As evidence, we Jmight recall Justice Field's circuit
decision in Chew Heong, overruling three other judges in holding that the
collector's certificate was the only acceptable evidence of previous U.S.
residence, 237 or his decision in In re Ah Moy (Case of the Chinese Wife) that
an immigrating wife, though she did not assume the laborer status of her
husband, was still required to present a laborer's certificate to deboard.238
Just as certainly, the U.S. Supreme Court's record in protecting the
Chinese against hostile rulings is less than stellar. To be sure, Yick Wo is not
the only case in which the Supreme Court vindicated critical rights of
the Chinese. The Supreme Court overruled Justice Field's decision in
Chew Heong, holding that under U.S. treaty obligations, laborers in the
country on November 17, 1880, had the right to come and go as they
232. Id. at 156-57.
233. In re Look Tin Sing, 21 E 905, 909-10 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884); McCLAIN, supra note
7, at 163-64.This case was not appealed to the Supreme Court.
234. MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 149.
235. Id. at 153-54 (discussing In re Low Yam Chow (Case of the Chinlese Merchant), 13
F 605, 63 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882)).
236. McCI.AIN, supra note 7, at 282.
237. Id. at 161-62. McClain notes that the practice at that time was that the presid-
ing judge could overrule other judges, even if they outnumbered him. Id. at 162.
238. In re Ah Moy (Case of the Chinese Wife), 21 F 785, 785-86 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884).
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pleased without producing a collector's certificate.2 39 And certainly the
Court's holding in Wong Kim Ark that U.S. born persons of Chinese descent
are citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment is even more important,
though its rhetoric is certainly less than ringing from a civil rights per-
spective.24 0
Despite these few cases, on the whole, the United States Supreme
Court's opinions display little effort to protect the Chinese against a tide
of legislation attempting to make their lives as miserable as possible, par-
ticularly at the federal level. For example, before Yick Wo, in Soon Hing v.
Crowley, the Court refused to permit a writ of habeas corpus to be issued
for a Chinese launderer who was imprisoned for violating the 10:00 p.m.
curfew ordinance.241 After Yick Wo, the Court continued to decide con-
tested cases against the Chinese-almost stretching to do so-in contrast
to the more measured rulings of California District Court Judges Sawyer
and Hoffman.2 4 2 For example, in Lem Moon Sing v. United States, the Court
affirmed that there was no judicial review of a final administrative deci-
sion of deportation due to a Congressional statute barring such review.243
In Quock Ting v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a Court could
reject a petitioner's habeas corpus petition even though his testimony was
not contradicted by any other evidence.244
In interpreting the substantive rules for admission, the Court also
usually found against the Chinese. In United States v. Lee Yen Tai, the Court
239. See MCCL.AIN, supra note 7, at 165-67 (discussing In re Chew Heong, 112 U.S.
536, 543, 550 (1884)). There were also some interesting attempts to harass the Chinese that
the Court rebutted. See, e.g., Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1926) (hold-
ing unconstitutional a statute that made it illegal to keep account books in the Philippines
in any language other than English).
240. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). The first part of the
lengthy opinion in Wong Kim Ark is a discourse on development of common law princi-
ples about how the subjects of the King were traditionally determined, with an essential
holding that all children born in Crown territories were English subjects except for the
children of foreign ambassadors or enemies occupying Crown territories. See id. at 655-
72.
241. Chin, supra note 6, at 1373 (discussing Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703
(1885)).
242. There are, of course, some exceptions where the Court encountered particularly
egregious administrative behavior and overturned the administrators' rulings. For example,
the Court held in Liu Hop Fong, 209 U.S. 453, 463 (1908), that a court may not order
deportation based on a commissioner's transcript that contains no findings nor any tran-
script of evidence.
243. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 549 (1895). In this case, the
merchant was excluded even though he did everything "right" (i.e. he produced two
White witnesses attesting to his presence in the U.S. before he left). He was denied en-
trance based on an Attorney General opinion that the 1893 act did not permit the return
of a merchant unless his name could be found in the name of the business for which he
worked. MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 216. The collector refused him entrance even after a
Ninth Circuit order invalidated that opinion. Id. at 217.
244. 140 U.S. 417,420 (1891).
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refused to rule that a later, more Chinese-friendly treaty abrogated a pre-
vious statute that permitted easy exclusion of Chinese immigrants.245 In
Yee Won v. White, the Court held that the Chinese wife and child of a mer-
chant's son could not enter the United States without the requisite $1,000
in property required for laborers to bring their families to the United
States. The Court reasoned that they assumed the son's status, and that he
had become a laborer while he was in the United States.2 46 As late as 1928,
the Court held in Nagle v. Loi Hoa that Chinese merchants could not be
admitted to the United States if they could only produce the merchant's
certificate from French Indo-China, where they had long resided, rather
than China, their place of birth.24 7 The court also refused jurisdiction in
some cases, and in others, permitted Congress to restrict due process
rights for the Chinese being deported. 24 8
As noted earlier, it is tempting to suggest that in the Chinese cases,
the Supreme Court was merely recognizing its limits as a court and acting
as a common law court should. In that view, the duty of the Court was to
take each case on its merits and decide it within the four corners of the
treaties with China and the increasingly restrictive federal statutes govern-
ing the entry of the Chinese. However, as both the civil rights era cases
and the Chinese cases suggest, the Supreme Court cannot act as a com-
mon law court by pretending that each case is sul generis and governs
only those before the court. In the context of epic struggles over civil
rights, that posture is many times disingenuous because the Court's pro-
nouncements against minorities have a profound impact on the national
conversation over minority rights. When the Court takes its public role
seriously, as in the civil rights cases in the 1960s, its rulings have at least
the promise of making a political and social difference on behalf of mi-
norities. When it fails to do so, as it did in the Chinese cases, cases such
as Yick Wo take on the cast of a pretentious moment of self-
congratulation and fail to serve their purpose.
245. See LeeYenTai, 185 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1902).
246. SeeYee Won v.White, 256 U.S. 399, 400-01 (1921).
247. See Nagle v. Loi Hoa, 275 U.S. 475,481-82 (1928).
248. See, e.g., Ex parte Hung Hang, 108 U.S. 552 (1883) (denying jurisdiction on a
writ of habeas corpus for an alleged illegal immigrant); Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698 (1893) (upholding the exclusion of Chinese witnesses in a deportation pro-
ceeding and the right of Congress to provide for registration of Chinese laborers going
abroad); Li Sing v. United States, 180 U.S. 486 (1901) (upholding the exclusion of Chinese
witnesses, and holding with Fong Yue Ting that deportation orders are not punishment
and need not be attended by criminal due process protections); Fok Yung You v. United
States, 185 U.S. 296 (1902) (denying jurisdiction of a review of a detention of a Chinese
man who was passing through the United States on his way to Mexico); Lee Lung v. Pat-
terson, 186 U.S. 168 (1902) (refusing jurisdiction to review collector's decision not to let
the wife and child of a merchant land, even though he was permitted to do so and they
had presented Hong Kong certificates of identity).
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IV LESSON THREE: THE SUPREME COURT NEEDS TO BE MORE SERIOUS
ABOUT ITS REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE IN EQUAL
PROTECTION DISCRIMINATION CASES
In some areas of recent constitutional adjudication, such as in its re-
cent establishment clause jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has had a
serious and complex discussion about how it should review legislative
purpose.2 9 Racial discrimination claims brought under the equal protec-
tion clause do not reflect a similar pattern. In many constitutional law
texts, Yick Wo is paired with Gomillion v. Lightfoot to stand for the proposi-
tion that legislative purpose will be found invidious when the racially
disparate impact is "tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathemati-
cal demonstration" that the legislature's purpose is to segregate people on
the basis of race. 250 There have been few cases, particularly since Batson v.
Kentucky,251 which have attempted to define what the Supreme Court
meant when it decided that "discriminatory intent" would be required for
a constitutional violation in Washington v. Davis.252 The Court has since
then been less than willing to seriously explore and discuss the kinds of
evidence that will give rise to an inference, presumption, or finding of
invidious legislative purpose. Perhaps the best we have are some references
by the Court that attempt to give some vague definition to the substan-
tive standard to be employed: for example, the Court's reference to
"animus" or "the bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group," a
term that Justice Scalia rightly implies is ill-defined.253 Or we might look
at the Feeney recitation that a legislature must pass a law "because of" its
harmful impact on a disadvantaged group and not "in spite of" that im-
pact. 254 (As I will note, the 1970s cases Village of Arlington Heights25 5 and
Batson v. Kentucky'"6 are among the few exceptions that do attempt to set
standards.)
249. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859-74, 889-94 (2005);
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302-10 (2000) (including Scalia,J., dissent-
ing); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679-81, 690-93 (1984) (majority opinion and
O'Connor,J., concurring).
250. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960).
251. 476 U.S.79 (1986).
252. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (deciding that a law with a racial-
ly discriminatory impact does not violate the equal protection clause unless the law also
has a racially discriminatory purpose). The Court has often ignored justice Stevens' con-
curring opinion that often "the most probative evidence of intent will be objective
evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of
mind of the actor" and that "the actor is presumed to have intended the natural conse-
quences of his deeds." Id. at 253 (StevensJ., concurring).
253. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (Scalia,J., dissenting).
254. See Pers. Admin. Of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
255. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
256. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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Over and over in its jurisprudence, the Court has acknowledged
that legislative motivation is rarely clear or pure.25 7 Yet, it has failed, over
time, to grapple in any realistic or disciplined way with the question of
how invidious purpose can be identified and proven by plaintiffs, especial-
ly in those circumstances where "everybody knows" what the purpose of
the law is but the legislative body has the good sense not to put the pur-
pose of the law in the preamble.
Despite that lack of guidance, the principle Yick Wo is known for
cannot be the constitutional standard: that rule suggests that if a law harms
virtually everyone in one class (here, the Chinese laundrymen) and no-
body in another (here, all of the White laundrymen except one), the
Court should find discriminatory purpose. For one thing, such a standard
gives a Court unwilling to protect minorities a good excuse to permit
discriminatory business as usual. For example, in another discriminatory
enforcement case, Ah Sin v. Wittman, the Supreme Court refused to invali-
date selective police raids against Chinese gambling houses, distinguishing
Yick Wo on the grounds that there was insufficient proof that such gam-
bling "did not exist exclusively among the Chinese, or that there were
other offenders against the ordinance than the Chinese as to whom it was
not enforced."258
Of course, it will not always be the case that a legislative body hell-
bent on harming the plaintiff class will be successful in its aim if it uses
only facially neutral statutes. The Chinese basket-carrier's law is a good
example of this: when the court upheld the law prohibiting carrying poles
on baskets on the sidewalk as a "neutral" exercise of the police power
(much like an earlier prohibition of slaughterhouses in the city) and re-
fused to take the discriminatory motive of the ordinance seriously,25 9 the
response of the Chinese was simply to move their poles to the streets, or
to carry a single basket without a pole.260 Thus, the supervisors' attempt to
harass the Chinese in this way failed.
This willingness by the courts, including the Supreme Court, to
turn a blind eye to racially discriminatory legislative motives and goals
was all too evident in the Chinese cases, with significant consequences.
That the legislature was populated by anti-Chinese members was easy to
observe. For example, in the elections of 1879, the bottom of the ballot in
San Francisco was printed with the words, "Against Chinese Immigra-
tion."2 61 The California Supreme Court refused to see any invidious
purpose in the early cases. Even though they invalidated it, they even re-
fused to see animus in the Foreign Miners' License Tax that treated all
257. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) (noting that it is often
difficult or impossible to identify the sole or predominant motive of the legislature).
258. 198 U.S. 500,507-08 (1905).
259. MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 46.
260. Id. at 47.
261. Kauer, supra note 18, at 287.
[VOL. 17:217256
resident foreigners of a mining district as miners, even though that law
could not have been referring to anybody but the Chinese.2 62 While, as in
the civil rights era, it is hard to prove cause and effect between state and
federal Supreme Court decisions and legislative actions, these decisions
failing to protect the Chinese were followed by law after law against the
Chinese in California.263 Even after Congress acted to declare racial dis-
crimination illegal in 18 7 0,264 new measures passed in 1880 permitted
cities to segregate the Chinese in their own ghettos in cities or move
them outside of city boundaries, and refused them business and commer-
cial fishing licenses. 265 There were also legislative attempts to make it a
felony for the Chinese to have an occupation, and to prohibit businesses
from keeping books in languages other than English. 266 Bills also attempt-
ed to impose a tax solely on Chinese residents collectible by the state
militia, and tax the product used to make starch utilized in Chinese laun-
dries, which allegedly gave them a competitive advantage in the
industry.267
Of more direct consequence, in a case reminiscent of the Supreme
Court's sleight of hand in Plessy, the California Supreme Court refused to
find invidious discrimination in California's "separate but equal" approach
to Chinese testimony. In People v. Brady, which challenged the bar against
Chinese witnesses testifying against White people, the California court
reasoned that both Chinese and White criminals received the same pun-
ishment if they were convicted, and both could use the testimony of
Whites while neither could use the testimony of Chinese witnesses.268
Because they could now not defend themselves in court, the California
court essentially made it "open season" on Chinese miners and others
who dared to cross the paths of resentful Whites.269
The lengths to which state court judges went in order to avoid de-
claring that discriminatory intent motivated legislative bodies are, in
retrospect, almost comical. 2 0 County court Judge John Stanley, for example,
262. See MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 24 (discussing Ex parte Ah Pong, 19 Cal. 106
(1861), which invalidated the Foreign Miners' License Tax), 36-40 (discussing Congress-
man Stewart's attempts to secure the rights of the Chinese in Section 16 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1870).
263. Id. at 25-26.
264. Id. at 40.
265. Id. at 92.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 92-93.
268. Id. at 35 (discussing People v. Brady, 40 Cal. 198, 208 (1870)).
269. Id. at 31-36 (discussing cases in which Whites attacked Chinese victims and the
victims were not allowed to testify in their own behalf, thus freeing the White defendants).
270. See, e.g., Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1885) (upholding a laun-
dry hours regulation prohibiting washing from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. on the basis that
the law was not facially discriminatory against Chinese launderers); Chin, supra note 6, at
1373-74 (exploring the courts' reasoning in the Yick Wo and Soon Hing cases).
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rejected a discriminatory intent charge leveled against a laundry ordi-
nance which required laundrymen who did not use a horse and
wagon-obviously directed at the Chinese who could not afford
them-to pay a fifteen dollar license fee.Judge Stanley noted that he did
not need to inquire about legislative motivation even though he
acknowledged the discrimination against both launderers "of lesser
means" and the Chinese. Rebuffing the challenge, he stated "[s]uggestion
has been made that the order was intended to apply primarily to a race of
persons not expressly designated in it. However that may be, this Court
has nothing to do with the secret motives or intentions of the body
which passed the order."2 7 1 Even the newspapers admitted what judges
like Stanley would not. The San Francisco Evening Bulletin reacted to the
queue ordinance requiring the county jail to shave off the pigtails of all
convicted prisoners, and to an ordinance requiring coroner permission to
disinter the dead that was meant to harass the Chinese returning their
family members' remains to China, by noting the deep humiliation these
laws caused the Chinese.272
In the early years, even federal judges in California were reluctant to
impute invidious motives to the state legislature and local supervisors.
When the defendants requested the court to take judicial notice of a dis-
criminatory enforcement pattern against the Chinese in a boarding house
ordinance, Judge Hoffman declared that "the court had no right to in-
quire into the motives of the legislature and disclaimed any knowledge
that the law in question was being enforced only against the Chinese."2 73
In the same fashion, the U.S. Supreme Court in Ah Sin v. Wittman, faced
with discriminatory enforcement of a gambling ordinance in a case reni-
niscent of Yick Wo, responded that the government "would have no
incentive in race or class prejudice or administration in race or class dis-
crimination" and suggested that a court would need to be certain of
discriminatory intent before striking down any law because of it.274
However, some ordinances evinced too much discriminatory moti-
vation even for the federal judges to take. Judge Hoffman invalidated the
humiliating queue ordinance both because it was a punishment the su-
pervisors were not authorized to impose, and because it was class
legislation directed at persons entitled to equal protection. In his opinion,
Judge Hoffman stated:
271. MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 51-52; see also Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703,
711 (1885) (where the U.S. Supreme Court similarly notes "[tlhe diverse character of such
motives, and the impossibility of penetrating into the hearts of men and ascertaining the
truth, precludes all such inquiries as impracticable and futile."); Chin, supra note 6, at 1389
(noting the Court's view in Soon Hing that even if there were an improper motive, the
Chinese would still have to prove discriminatory enforcement).
272. McCLAIN, supra note 7, at 48-49.
273. Id. at 69.
274. Ah Sin v.Wittman, 198 U.S. 500,507-08 (1905).
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[W]e cannot shut our eyes to matters of public notoriety and
general cognizance. When we take our seats on the bench we
are not struck with blindness, and forbidden to know as judges
what we see as men; and where an ordinance, though general
in its terms, only operates upon a special race, sect or class, it
being universally understood that it is to be enforced only
against that race, sect or class, we may justly conclude that it
was the intention of the body adopting it that it should have
only such operation, and treat it accordingly.27 5
Similarly, at a certain point, Judge Sawyer had enough, noting in Wo
Lee:
If the facts ... shown by the notorious public and municipal
history of the times, indicate a purpose to drive out the Chi-
nese laundrymen, and not merely to regulate the business for
the public safety, does it not disclose a case of violation of the
provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the national con-
stitution, and of the treaty between the United States and
China in more than one particular? ... That it does mean pro-
hibition, as to the Chinese, it seems to us must be apparent to
every citizen of San Francisco who has been here long enough
to be familiar with the course of an active and aggressive
branch of public opinion and of public notorious events. Can a
court be blind to what must necessarily be known to every in-
telligent person in the state?276
Finally, in In re Lee Sing, the San Francisco supervisors had passed the
Bingham Ordinance, which would relocate any ethnic Chinese in San
Francisco to a single area. 27  Judge Sawyer held that its purpose, which
should be apparent to anyone, was to "forcibly drive out a whole com-
munity" of 20,000 people, irrespective of their individual merits or
situation.278
Despite these few candid assessments, in most cases, both state and
federal courts suggested their unwillingness to search the context and the
persistence of legislative attempts to harm the Chinese. They turned a blind
eye to discriminatory ordinances and discriminatory enforcement, even
when the Chinese were "repeat players" before those courts, except in
those cases where the law was so absurd that it was virtually impossible to
find any other explanation for the law. These opinions are consistent with
the intimations in Yick Wo and Gomillion-and indeed, the declaration in
275. Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 255 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6,546).
276. In re Wo Lee, 26 F 471, 474-75 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886).
277. In re Lee Sing, 43 F 359,360-61 (C.C.D. Cal. 1890).
278. Id.; see also McCAIN, supra note 7, at 230.
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modern-day cases such as Romer v. Evans279 -that legislative motivation will
be presumed to be benign unless there is no other reasonable explanation
but discrimination for the law. While such a rule may well be appropriate in
cases where an isolated piece of legislation comes before the courts in juris-
dictions with no history of legislative targeting of a minority (as in most of
the Court's "rational basis" decisions),28 it Surely cannot be an appropriate
rule when many cases before the courts evince a determination by the leg-
islative body to disadvantage a minority class. For the courts to pretend, by
reviewing these cases in isolation, that nothing untoward is going on in
this jurisdiction is to invite further legislative punishment of the disadvan-
taged class and thus to be an accomplice in perpetuating evil against that
class.
The task of searching legislative motivation is not as hard as it appears.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has provided two fair and non-burdensome
methods of determining whether the legislature is invidiously harming a
plaintiff class. Justice Stevens puts it in a more complex way: the courts
should examine whether "an impartial lawmaker could logically believe
the classification would serve a legitimate purpose that transcends the
harm to the members of the disadvantaged class."28'
One of these methods is the factor approach of Arlington Heights,
which combines subjective evidence such as legislative history statements
and testimony by lawmakers with objective evidence such as departures
from standard procedure and substantive changes. 282 Coupled with a
strong but rebuttable presumption of benign legislative intent, this ap-
proach should reveal those cases in which legislative motivation, though
not described on the face of the law, is clearly invidious. With appropriate
judicial review and more specific criteria, the Arlington Heights approach
would protect legislatures against the concern that a court might invali-
date legislation because of isolated legislative statements or disagreement
with the substance of the law. The other approach that the federal courts
have effectively used is the burden-shifting approach of Castaneda v. Par-
tida283 and Batson v. Kentucky.284 This approach required the legislature to
come up with evidence that its reasons were legitimate if there is clear
disparate impact on the plaintiff class and some evidence, though not to
279. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996).
280. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (grandfathering in cart
sellers in New Orleans); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding statute
not permitting opticians to provide glasses without a prescription).
281. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
282. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Arlington Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977).
283. 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977).
284. 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986).
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the level of certainty that Yick Wo or Gomillion required, that there is some
legislative hostility to a minority class. 285
It is not clear why the Court has refused to extend these approaches
to all equal protection cases requiring discriminatory intent, even when
they have proven useful in those cases where the Court has applied them.
It is not even clear how the Court decides which cases to apply them
in. 286 But the Court's failure to consistently apply these rules becomes
clear in many of its cases. Perhaps most prominently, the Court seemed to
ignore these rulings in City of Mobile v. Bolden, in which case it rejected a
significant amount of Arlington Heights "factor" evidence that suggested
racially discriminatory gerrymandering,287 and in City of Richmond v.JA.
Croson Company, where the Court similarly brushed aside significant evi-
dence of discriminatory exclusion of African American contractors from
Richmond construction projects.288 This approach, which holds plaintiffs
to a nearly impossible evidentiary burden in equal protection cases, stands
in clear contrast to the willingness of members of the Rehnquist court to
describe affirmative action facial classifications as "odious" and constitu-
tionally on par with the more insidious and persistent attempts to harm a
minority class demonstrated in the Chinese cases.
285. Id.; Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494.
286. For example, the Court has favorably cited the Arlington Heights approach in
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (regarding electoral districts), Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (school desegregation), Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S.
231, 235 (2005) (alleging jury panel discrimination), Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993)(citing value of Arlington Heights factors in proof
of religiously discriminatory motivation under the Free Exercise Clause), Reno v. Bossier
Parish Sch. Bd., 520 US. 471 (1997) and Reno v. Bossier Parish (Bossier Parish 11) 528 U.S.
320, 326 (2000) (favorably citing Arlington Heights under the Voting Rights Act). By con-
trast, the Court failed to use either methodology in City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye
Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 194 (2003) (referendum on appeal of housing ordi-
nance), Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991) (alleged racial discrimination for
using jury strikes to exclude Spanish-speaking jurors), and Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993) (refusing to use either methodology in 42 U.S.C. 1985
claim about gender discrimination). But see id. at 375-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
the failure to use burden-shifting rule), City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981)
(alleging racial discrimination in street ordinance); id. at 141 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (re-
garding the application of the Arlington Heights criteria); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 267 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing for use of Arlington Heights factors and
burden shifting underTitle VIl).
287. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 72-74 (1980).
288. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating
affirmative action city contracting scheme). See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
294, 298 n.20 (1987) (refusing to consider past history of discrimination as relevant to
discriminatory intent challenge).
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V. LESSON FOUR:THE COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO AFFIRM
THE BELIEFS OF A MAJORITY CLASS THAT THEIR CLASS IS
ENTITLED TO THE MATERIAL RICHES AND OPPORTUNITIES
THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS TO AFFORD
As a Property teacher, I often remind students that property con-
cepts, particularly those we unconsciously use to organize our sense of
justice, pervade social understandings in civil rights cases. The saga of Yick
Wo should remind the Court that it is neither courageous nor just to give
in to social assumptions about who owns the social, moral, or material
resources of our country.
From the very beginning of the conflict between Whites and the
Chinese over material property and economic opportunity in the nine-
teenth century, Whites made it clear that they assumed that the United
States and its riches were theirs to own and exploit. We might remember
the ubiquitous slogan during that period: "California for the Ameri-
cans." 289 From the 1852 pronouncements of California Governor John
Bigler, who felt that "[e]xtraordinary measures were needed ... [to] 'check
[the] tide of Asiatic immigration,' "290 to the U.S. Supreme Court's up-
holding of the Geary Act with its "pass" system in 1893, the constant
theme of legislative, executive, and judicial validation of popular hysteria
about the Chinese sounded in property theory's "absolute right to ex-
clude."
The response of White manufacturers to competition from the Chi-
nese in their own industries is illustrative: in industries such as canneries
and woolen mills, where White industrialists did not have to worry about
Chinese competition because the capital start-up costs were too high,
employers welcomed the Chinese as a low-cost source of labor that could
keep White male and female workers' demands in check (although they
were as willing as others to believe in the cultural superiority of
Whites).29' By contrast, in the shoe and cigar industries, where the Chi-
nese who learned the trades could compete with Whites, manufacturers
quickly jumped on the bandwagon in supporting the Chinese Exclusion
Act, aggressively portraying the Chinese as "inferior and socially disrup-
tive." 292 Indeed, in the cigar industry, White competitors were all too
happy to scare the populace into buying "White" by circulating rumors
that "Chinese cigars were passed through 'Mongolian leprous hands' and
sealed with black spit. 293 While competitors often find ways to disparage
their opponents' commercial practices or goods, it is difficult to explain
289. See NORTON, supra note 17, at 286.
290. MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 10-11.
291. See Brown & Phillips, supra note 12, at 65-67.
292. Id. at 70-71.
293. Id. at 71.
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such class-based racist behavior apart from the assumption that White
entrepreneurs believed that economic opportunity belonged to them as a
class, and not to their Chinese counterparts.
This view that America was the God-given property of Whites per-
vaded the popular literature as well. In asking American consumers to
spend their money at White-owned rather than Chinese-owned laundries,
the Knights of Labor Pioneer Laundry Workers Assembly made it clear
who (in their view) was entitled to American fortune and who was not:
We say in conclusion that the CHINAMAN is a labor con-
sumer of our country without the adequate returns of
prosperity to our land as is given by the labor of our people to
our glorious country. Our motto should be: OUR
COUNTRY, OUR PEOPLE, GOD, AND OUR NATIVE
LAND."294
Many Californians were blatant about who was entitled to the
wealth of the country: Kearney's Workingmen's Party marched under slo-
gans such as, "This is a country for free White labor, not coolie labor."295
Lawmakers were not immune from the presumption that only
Whites deserved the economic opportunities available in the United
States. Indeed, sometimes they were quite blatant about it. For example,
laws passed by the California legislature included: "An Act to Protect Free
White Labor against competition with Chinese Coolie Labor, and to Dis-
courage the Immigration of the Chinese into the State of California,"296
and the capitation tax, entitled "An Act to Discourage the Immigration to
this State of Persons Who Cannot Become Citizens Thereof."297 And some
believed that only White people were entitled to jobs, a view embodied
in proposed Article XIX of the new California Constitution, which
would have barred Chinese immigrants from working on public works,
carrying on mercantile businesses, and obtaining jobs from corporations. 298
Similarly, California legislators demonstrated their hostility to sharing the
state's bounty with those of Chinese origin and interest in encouraging
Chinese immigrants to leave through laws coupling discriminatory taxa-
tion with prohibitions or disabilities on working in many of the state's
industries.
Politicians and legislatures were only too happy to affirm this notion
that the material prosperity of America belonged to Whites, even if they
294. MAGEE, supra note 31, at 2.
295. MARY P. RYAN, CIVIc WARS: DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC LIFE IN THE AMERICAN
CITY DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 287 (1997).
296. See MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 26.
297. Id. at 17.
298. Kauer, supra note 18, at 284-85. While not all of these proposals were passed and
some were later invalidated by the courts, the prohibition against corporations and public
works employing the Chinese was included in the constitution. Id.
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were not willing to do the dirty work the Chinese would do to earn it. In
1885, the San Francisco board of supervisors committee noted:
The fact that the race is one that cannot readily throw off its
habits and customs, the fact that these habits and customs are
so widely at variance with our own, makes the enforcement of
our laws and obedience to our laws necessarily obnoxious and
revolting to the Chinese, and the more rigidly this enforce-
ment is insisted upon and carried out the less endurable will
existence be to them, the less attractive will life be to them in
California. Fewer will come and fewer will remain.299
Similarly echoing the theme that America is for Whites, San Francis-
co mayor James Phelan defended a decision to quarantine all Chinese in
Chinatown because a man had died of bubonic plague in a residence ho-
tel in Chinatown. He claimed that the Chinese were
fortunate, with the unclean habits of their coolies and their
filthy hovels, to be permitted to remain within the corporate
limits of any American city. In an economic sense their pres-
ence has been, and is, a great injury to the working classes, and
in a sanitary sense, they are a constant menace to the public
health.3"
Perhaps the most literal symbol of Whites' views that they "owned"
the wealth of the United States was the Bingham ordinance of 1890. As
noted previously, that ordinance provided that no Chinese person could
live or conduct business in San Francisco outside of a narrow area previ-
ously set aside for slaughterhouses, tallow factories and other unhealthy
businesses. 30' The ordinance would have required all ethnic Chinese in
San Francisco, both in Chinatown and elsewhere, to leave the city or
move into the new district, giving up as much as $15 million in real es-
tate.302 The ordinance was aimed at stopping the spread of the alleged
cancer" or "ulcer" of a growing Chinatown that was cutting off the aris-
tocratic neighborhoods of Nob Hill and Powell/Mason from the
commercial center of the city.303 Though there had been plans for a test
case against the ordinance, Supervisor Bingham ran amok and arrested
seventy-five Chinamen living outside of this area, including a father tend-
ing to his sick child.304 Federal Judge Sawyer was so disgusted at the
allegations of the complaint that he ordered many of them stricken from
299. McC.AIN, supra note 7, at 278.
300. Id. at 241.
301. Id. at 224.
302. Id. at 229.
303. Id. at 225, 229.
304. Id. at 226.
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the record: the city alleged that the Chinese were criminal, vicious, im-
moral, incorrigible perjurers whose property decreased the value of
surrounding property; that they left their sick to die in the streets and
were a moral danger to other races; and that they had to be removed to
districts where they would have less contact with other races .30
In the end, Judge Sawyer expressed concern not only about the dis-
criminatory targeting of the Chinese, but also about the way the law
worked an arbitrary deprivation of property, putting the Chinese com-
pletely at the mercy of sellers in the district where they were to be
relocated.3 6 In the later years, as earlier suggested, the federal courts occa-
sionally were willing to see state and local ordinances for what they were:
attempts by Whites to take the hard-earned property rights of ethnic
Chinese persons, citizens and resident aliens alike, on the theory that only
Whites were entitled to the bounty of the country.
While the Bingham ordinance was perhaps the most egregious at-
tempt by majority Whites to claim ownership of American opportunity, it
is not simply a historical footnote. The Court's modern affirmative action
cases display White plaintiffs' similar assumptions that certain opportuni-
ties are "owed" to them as White persons.
Jennifer Gratz, who was denied admission to the University of
Michigan undergraduate program, demonstrates this unwritten expecta-
tion that the opportunities available from government belong to Whites
by right if only they work hard. Jennifer said that she "thought she was a
shoo-in" to the University because of her 83rd percentile ACT score, and
her background as a cheerleader, student body president, homecoming
queen, and volunteer. 307 She was so sure of herself that she had not applied
to any other school until she got a letter from the University indicating
that she was "well qualified, but less competitive" than other admitted
students.30 When she received her rejection:
[Jennifer was] devastated, angry, and embarrassed all at once.
Jennifer thought about all the hard work on her studies, extra-
curriculars, and application ... [She] was sure that something
had gone terribly wrong. Her thoughts flashed to a Hispanic
classmate who had been admitted to Michigan with lower
grades than hers. Finally, Jennifer uttered the first words that
came to her, "Dad," she said, "Can we sue them?"3 0
305. MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 229-30.
306. Id. at 230.
307. GREG STOHR, A BLACK AND WHITE CASE: How AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SURVIVED
ITS GREATEST LEGAL CHALLENGE 1 (2004).
308. Id. at 2.
309. Id.
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For Jennifer, the expectation that her classmate was not worthy be-
cause of his race and a number was firmly fixed. Her co-plaintiffs similarly
admitted in interviews that "they had been relatively confident they
would be admitted to Michigan and had done little to line up comparable
backup choices."3 10
Similarly, Allen Bakke, who set the affirmative action debate in edu-
cation on its course, maintained that he should have been admitted
because of his higher test scores, 3 1' even though an admissions interviewer
described him as opinionated with a limited approach to problems in the
medical profession. Indeed, he thought he was entitled to admission even
though several White students with lower scores had been admitted to his
claimed seat.3 12 And Marco DeFunis, who applied to the University of
Washington Law School "[f]eeling that his credentials were as good as
anyone's [and] that he was the victim of unfair treatment," claimed that
race discrimination was obvious given his LSAT score.313 This despite the
fact that of the seventy-four admitted law school applicants with scores
lower than his, thirty-eight were White and only thirty-six were identified
minorities.314 Although DeFunis had been accepted at four other law
schools, he insisted on attending Washington "because it would have saved
him and his wife an estimated $1,500 a year in possibly lost salaries."3 1 1
This pattern is repeated in employment affirmative action cases as
well. Randy Pech, the principal in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, com-
plained to anyone who would listen that "government programs that
disfavored White men were gaining momentum."31 6 Highly cognizant of
the fact that his was the only "White" guardrail company in his area, he
310. Id.
311. Supreme Court: Affirmative Action: Landmark Case Set Principle 25 Years Ago, ATLAN-
TA J. & CONST.,June 24, 2003 at A4, available at 2003 WLNR 6245865.
312. Regents of the Univ.of Cal. Davis v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 276-277 n.7 (1978).
By contrast, Cheryl Hopwood, who won her affirmative action case against the University
of Texas (and who, the district judge admitted, would not necessarily have been admitted
even absent racial considerations) seems to acknowledge that disadvantage was an appro-
priate consideration in admissions. Jennifer told the press, "I thought I was disadvantaged
too, but that didn't count for me." David Savagetimes, "Bakke II" Case Renews Debate on
Admissions, Los ANGELES TIMES 1, July 30, 1995, available at 1995 WLNR 4472994.
Hopwood noted her upbringing as a child of a single working parent and her own strug-
gles as a mother of a severely handicapped daughter working twenty hours a week while
she maintained a 3.8 GPA. Id. On the other hand, she noted, "[n]o one's ever given me
any help. By the time you get to graduate school, shouldn't we all be on equal footing,"
Steven G. Michaud, Texas Affirmative-Action Case Could Be New Landmark, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM 25, May 14, 1995, available at 1995 WLNR 1169732.
313. IvoR KRAFT, DEFUNIS V. ODEGAARD, RACE, MERIT AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 27, 29 (1976).
314. Id. at 29.
315. Id. at 175 n.168.
316. Joan Biskupic, High Court to Hear Racial-Preference Case, ALBANY TIMES UNION,
Jan. 17, 1995, at A4, available at 1995 WLNR 317039.
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claimed that when he heard that he had submitted the low bid but the
contract would go to a minority firm, "I flipped.""' It is a pattern repeat-
ed in gender as well as race cases. For example, Paul Johnson, who was
passed over for the job of Santa Clara County highway dispatcher, "always
believed that if you set goals and worked hard, you could achieve them."m8
He testified, "I knew there was no one else taking the test that was any-
where near qualified as I was .... Usually, if you're doing the job, you
automatically get it."3'9 In fact, when the woman who was instead hired
applied for the position, her supervisor shouted, "don't you realize that
you're taking a man's job away?"320
Each of these plaintiffs implicitly believed that he or she was entitled
to a job or opportunity as a virtual "property" right even if there is no
legal foundation for that assumption: no one is legally entitled to be ad-
mitted to a public university even with a perfect test score, and no one is
legally entitled to receive a public construction contract even if his work
is exceptional and his costs are low. These plaintiffs' responses suggest that
they were expecting, as property, a benefit tied to their hard work and
overall qualities, a benefit which they automatically assumed the minority
who gained "their spot" had not earned.
Of more concern is the fact that the Supreme Court both acknowl-
edges White plaintiffs' anger over losing their "entitlements" and uses their
property assumptions as a policy justification for invalidating affirmative
action programs. The Court treats affirmative action plaintiffs as "inno-
cent" victims of the programs, implying that the minorities who received
the benefits of the programs were not "innocent."32 ' More critically, the
Court accepts the hostility and stigmatization of Whites directed at recipi-
ents of affirmative action as a primary justification for striking down these
programs. Such programs can "lead to a politics of racial hostility"322 and
"resentment" by "innocent victims" of those who receive benefits. In af-
firming such feelings held by people like Jennifer Gratz, the Court seems
unwilling to recognize that only those persons who believe they have
something in the nature of a "property interest" or entitlement to the
benefit at issue will be resentful or stereotype minorities to justify their
failure to get what was "theirs."
The consequences of accepting the unexamined and perhaps un-
conscious beliefs of majority "victims" that they and not minorities are
entitled to the benefits of American society are manifested in the Chinese
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cases. Property is protected, at least in part, because it provides security of
person and other property to the owner. In times of high economic and
social anxiety, human beings will resort to extraordinary means to protect
their property, including, as we saw in the Chinese cases, killing, threaten-
ing and driving others out. If the costs of violence are too high, persons
who believe their property is at risk will make those who compete for
what is "theirs" miserable, using the auspices of the law wherever possible.
For the Supreme Court to accept any dominant group's unconscious be-
liefs that they are entitled to the opportunities available in the United
States-that these opportunities are their "property"-is like putting a
loaded gun in their hands for the time the decide to utilize their stronger
social or economic position to "take" that property out of the hands of
other deserving persons with less power.The Chinese cases prove no less.
CONCLUSION
The Chinese cases pose a continuing affront to the promise of equal
protection that the Court has enunciated in many modern cases, particu-
larly in affirmative action cases. We cannot forget them in a time when
the Court seems reluctant to discern any legislative purpose but a benign
one, unless the government is dabbling in religion or dares to put a racial
classification on the face of a statute. We cannot certainly forget them in a
time when the Court seems reluctant to assume that racial and ethnic
mnorities are especially at risk in a majority-rule system roiled by eco-
nomic and social anxiety. There is a glaring contrast between the Court's
persistent and aggressive role in supporting the civil rights movement of
the early 1960s and its painful attempts to ignore the hostility leveled
against the Chinese by local, state, and federal governments in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The Chinese cases should be a reminder to the Court of what will
happen if it validates the fear-producing legislation aimed at the "other,"
especially the immigrant. They should make the Court think carefully
about the social and political backlash if it fails to conscientiously and
persistently assume its role in the constitutional scheme as a protector of
minority interests. It is a small victory that some federal judges, despite
racist biases operating in their own private lives, believed that the honor
of the law and the nation's treaty promises outweighed contemporary
views about the claimed social inferiority of the Chinese. It is a perhaps
small victory that Yick Wo is remembered as the constitutional promise we
make to minorities. But it is a significant defeat that we do not all re-
member the tragic circumstances that brought Yick Wo to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
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